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Executive Summary 
 
Energy security refers to the security of supply in the context of reliability, availability and 
affordability. There have been disruptive events on a continuous basis such as the Russia-
Ukraine Conflict, the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War that brought the energy trade to a halt. 
In fact, the aforementioned countries are all familiar to the energy agenda. It is as clear as crystal 
that most of the disagreements and disputes derive from contradictory national interests of states. 
Energy security may be ensured if all the parties sit around the table, negotiate and maintain 
constant dialogues; this may prevent the conflict of interests. For example, the European Union 
is a successful negotiator because it represents 28 member states that have strong economies, 
literacy rate, standards of living and many other things. On an individual basis, some of the 
member states are likely to be unsuccessful in an attempt to voice over their energy interests that 
simply rely on their national interests. This attempt may yield irremediable results such as the 
execution of stiffer and unfair commercial practices that increase the energy dependence of that 
particular state.  This is what the European Union has been stressing for so long; to band together 
and adopt mutual energy policies and strategies to increase the bargaining power and influence 
of all the member states. International organizations may serve for the interests of energy 
importers and exporters and mediate in case that the dialogues reach a dead-end. The service 
may be in the form of know-how, energy market forecasts, establishment of dialogues and 
relations, securing of energy infrastructure and many others. Energy dependence is on the agenda 
of every member state; and obviously, the European Union suffers from the same problem. The 
EU drafts policies and strategies in accordance with the interests of the major European 
economies and executes them. This has been the conventional procedure until recently. The 
European Union arrives at the decision that the best method to reduce its energy dependence is to 
export market economy principles to energy exporting countries and preaches them to switch to 
liberalized energy market structure for a safe and sound economy. Each and every country has 
the intention to hedge itself from energy disruptions which could easily spoil the national 
economy, political stability and social welfare.    
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Energy security refers to the security of supply in the context of reliability, availability and 
affordability. The risks attached to the security of supply are becoming more visible as people 
conceive that the current consumption patterns are not economically sustainable in the long-run 
and it has enormous adverse effects on the ecosystem and human health. The fact that we 
observe an energy demand shift from industrialized countries to developing countries which rely 
on fossil fuels and usually reluctant to follow the recent trends that has been occuring in the 
developed countries; this includes switching from fossil fuels to renewable energy and investing 
in energy efficient technologies. Also, the changes have political consequences that form new 
relations between the energy rich countries and developing countries.  
Over a course of period, the developed countries have invested heavily on the unconvetional 
energy resources that is nation-wide available but costly to exploit and utilize. However, not 
every developed country has the necessary means to follow the trend as well. Some are restricted 
with the legislations; some are constrained with capital problems to imitate or purchase the high-
tech equipments to exploit, and some are not gifted with natural resources at all. But as we 
continue to go with the assumption that most of the countries have been gifted with different 
qualities of coal forms, they have developed technologies and infrastructure to sustain their 
energy needs over the time. Coal is an unclean fossil fuel in consideration with the fact that 
exploitiation is dangerous; emissions from coal-fired power plants emit more than other forms of 
power plants; it is economically not viable to transport and trade and it is not finit.  
The technology to exploit wind and solar energy is also available and heavily invested. The cost 
of these technologies get cheaper as we manufacture them in large quantities and most of the 
countries can afford to build such wind and solar farms to cover some of their energy needs if not 
hundred percent but renewable energy has its own issues. From the perspective of relaibility, 
people are concerned and this concern has to do with availability. The importance of the 
reliability issue is associated with having the necessary amount of energy to provide the 
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customers when there is need for it. The research is going to investigate the subject of energy 
security from all the angles above in depth through the chapters.  
As the research begins to explore specific aspects of energy security, the distinctive roles of 
international organizations and their potential to contribute to energy security is going to be 
discussed. This research continues with the investigation of economic and political dimensions 
of energy security from the perspective of the European Union. The research elaborates on the 
European Union’s energy security policy development process; the determinants of energy 
policies; the transition period to mutual strategies at the European Union level and key issues. In 
the final chapter, this research is going to reveal the evolution of sophisticated energy relations 
between the major energy suppliers and the European Union. Last but not least, the research is 
going to expose the awry energy relations based on bilateral agreements, national policies and 
interests and other commitments between the parties. The conclusion is going to clarify the main 
points of the research and may include several new details.  
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1.1. The Concept of Security of Supply 
 
The concept of security of supply emerged with the growing concern over access to crude oil 
with reasonable prices. This concern is mainly driven by the historical events such as the OPEC 
embargo of oil exports on chosen countries, Iranian revolution in 1979 and Iran-Iraq war in 
1980-88. The Western world has realized the importance of being independent from energy 
exporting countries. However, being completely independent from fossil fuel exporting countries 
wasn’t as easy as it sounded like. The Western world started to investigate alternative energy 
resources to oil and claimed that natural gas could be a reliable alternative.  
 
Fossil fuels became vital for the normal functioning of industrialized countries. Transportation 
uses a significant portion of fossil fuels along with power plants that produce electricity. It is not 
easy to point out an industry that could be mentioned separately from fossil fuels. For example, 
farmers are in need of fossil fuels for agricultural operations and humans simply need energy for 
heating and cooling     
 
1.2. Definition 
 
There are several definitions available for the concept of energy security of supply. According to 
the International Energy Agency, energy security defined as “the uninterrupted availability of 
energy sources at an affordable price.” The European Commission (2000) defines energy 
security as the “uninterrupted physical availability on the market of energy products at a price 
which is affordable for all consumers.” Both definitions above are widely accepted and used. 
Bohi, Toman and Walls (1995) defined energy insecurity as “the loss of economic welfare that 
may occur as a result of a change in the price or availability of energy.” There are several 
keywords featured in any of the definitions above. Keywords indicate “accessibility, self-
sufficiency, affordability, availability, welfare and interruptions or disruptions.”   
 
1.3. Key Principles of Energy Security 
 
Accessibility emphasizes the importance of providing energy to the remote areas of a country. 
This usually refers to the rural areas that are lack of appropriate infrastructure.  
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Energy is demanded by everyone and has to be accessible by everyone (Dyer & Trombetta, 
2013: 178). Affordability refers to the economic aspect of energy security. This term found a 
place in the definition as the world experienced several supply disruptions along with 
everchanging energy prices. Yet, any of the disruptions may result in tremendous economic 
losses; energy security aims to mitigate the disastrous effects of sudden or unexpected shortages. 
Disruptions might occur due to natural disasters, technical difficulties, political instability, 
international embargoes, sabotage or economic factors. Energy security intends to respond any of 
the above scenarios. However, a state would usually be interested in expressing affordability in 
comparison to purchasing power or GDP per capita of its citizens. Self-sufficiency on the other 
hand is a broad term. It could mean that a country can meet its energy demand by the means of 
domestic production or at least could meet more than 50% of its demand. Self-sufficiency does 
not specifically relate to fossil fuels only but it could also refer to renewable energy. For 
example, Iceland is capable of meeting 85% of its domestic energy demand by geothermal 
energy and hydropower.  
 
Energy security can be reviewed from different aspects. In case of long-term approach, we are 
concerned with on time investments to supply energy as our economies depend on the 
availability and access to energy resources in order to grow. Short-term approach embraces the 
fact that in case of energy shortage, there has to be an appropriate measure or system to react 
immediately to balance the supply and demand (IEA, 2015).   
 
As stated above, the concept of security of supply has been widely accepted and thought as the 
availability of sufficient resources at affordable prices but nevertheless, every country takes the 
issue distinctly. Fossil fuel rich countries focus on the demand side of the issue as their exports 
rely on others’ demand, which in return plays a major role in the government revenues. Some of 
these countries insist on controlling national energy companies with the aim of gaining full 
power in decision making for the sake of the country; it is open to discussion. Some states like 
Russia take the advantage of its energy resources on their behalf by shaping their politics and 
strategies around energy industries.  
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Energy security concentrates on methods to mitigate or avoid risks. There are three keywords 
that could illustrate how efficient a country is in terms of risk avoidance. The three terms are 
sovereignty, resilience and robustness (Boersma, 2015).  
Robustness emphasizes the importance of taking cautionary measures to mitigate or avoid 
natural, technical and economic incidents that might result in supply disruptions. Economic 
incidents could be the aging of energy infrastructure, unexpected changes in energy prices, or an 
increase in the energy demand. To sum up, robustness is about strengthening or upgrading 
infrastructure, ensuring steady and affordable energy commodity prices and sufficient amount of 
resources.  
 
Sovereignty directly relates to national security; and therefore any threat that concerns 
sovereignty has to be immediately resolved. The threats could be governed by the hostile states 
or market agents with different interests. Usually, sovereignty in the context of energy security 
relates to the power that a state has to control its energy systems or the state of being energy 
independent. In a nutshell, sovereignty is about taking precautions to avoid obvious or potential 
threats from foreign agents in energy markets and endure in case of energy system disruptions. 
 
Resilience on the other hand, also relates to disruptions but these disruptions are usually less 
predictable in nature such as like weather events, emerging technologies or unpredictable 
political agendas. 
 
1.4. Emerging Issues and Trends 
 
Majority of the countries have issues with at least one of the three above perspectives. Industrial 
countries are vulnerable due to aged infrastructure and energy dependency. On the other hand, 
emerging countries, besides the two factors above, they also face capacity, energy intensity, 
price-related issues and increased demand problems.  
 
Oil is heavily used in transportation sector and the demand for transport fuel is consistently 
rising. Disruption of oil products may yield catashrophic events since transportation is a vital 
part of every economy. These events would likely to hit food industry, medical care and internal 
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security first. Also, production capacity of oil is limited and this could add extra burden on 
emerging economies due to volatile prices. Emerging economies with a steady increase in oil 
demand, and usually operating in a market with volatile prices, they can end up losing significant 
share of their GDPs.   
 
On the other side, rapid growing countries like China are fully concerned about their dependence 
on energy as their demand grows; and they make investments to become self-sufficient. 
However, Japan, an island country that imports almost hundred percent of everything that its 
domestic market needs, prefers to diversify its import intakes. As Japan is not gifted with natural 
resources, the country is exposed to all kind of market risks. Also, when investigated 
individually, the European countries in general possess some sorts of energy resources like coal, 
natural gas or shale oil. However, none of these resources are sufficient and infinite. Majority of 
the European countries also import resources from various fossil fuel rich countries. Their 
concern is also the same; to become completely energy independent, if not, to satisfy majority of 
their needs internally. France might choose to invest more in nuclear power instead of renewable 
energy. It is due to the fact that renewable energy, for now, is not fully reliable and persistent in 
quantity. France doesn’t find the idea of abandoning nuclear power completely right and safe. 
Energy security is not only concerned with continuous supply but also other aspects like the 
national security. Nuclear power plant locations are focal areas for potential threats. As the 
number of these plants increase, the threat also increases (Yergin, 2006). Apart from that, 
everybody still remembers the disastrous effects of Chernobyl and Fukushima explosions; this 
has to do with the environmental aspect of energy security. The world is still in search of 
methods to reduce the impact of nuclear waste; discharging the waste in the sea is literally 
murdering the sea ecosystem and if the thought procedure is to dump the waste in the soil, 
polluted soil will no longer be available for any purpose for millions of years.   
 
Germany has become a true sample for other European countries with their dedication to invest 
and expand the use of renewable energy resources and technologies. However, the country 
shows an increased trend in the use of coal which is controversial. It has to do with abandoning 
nuclear power at a stage when the country is not well-prepared to do so. Although, this strategy 
proves that the Germans are determined to do more for the sake of the plane  
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As of 2015, when energy security is discussed, oil is still at the core of the issue. Even though, it 
is not as costly as before to manufacture wind turbines or photovoltaics in large quantities, due to 
its low reliability and efficiency, the world is still not ready to switch from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy completely. According to BP Energy Outlook 2013, use of fossil fuels will 
play a major role globally until 2030 (BP Energy Outlook 2030, 2013). It is necessary to mention 
that renewable energy technologies are developing and improving every day. Scientists 
investigate wind turbines that could operate in higher altitudes where wind is stronger and the 
turbine could produce more energy. There are studies to improve the photovoltaics to capture the 
sunlight even when it is cloudy or rainy. Until now, renewable energy proved to be a good 
source for heating, power and electricity production; however transportation industry remained 
in misery. Hybrid or electric cars are good for people who don’t travel long distances but the 
ones who do, these are not good alternatives to traditional benzin or diesel cars.     
 
At the heart of the Energy security, there are two substantial topics: physical accessibility and 
affordability. If the accessibility of resources is below a certain point, the supply and demand 
balance collapses. The collapse demonstrates itself in the form of price surge and unequally 
distributed energy prices over a long period of time (Peet, 1992: 40). The most appropriate 
energy product pricing is based on the cost of exploration, extraction, processing activities, 
distribution and should include a reasonable profit. When energy exporting countries intend to 
price their products, the price has to be in accordance with the above costs and if more, other 
related costs should also be included; also it is important to notice that it might be politically 
correct to consider a pricing strategy that would promote the economic development and growth 
of importing countries. As we see both now and in the history, low energy prices are as 
dangerous as high energy prices. Since energy is also used as a strategic tool by the exporting 
countries to have a voice in the world energy markets, their strategies such as limiting the 
exports or driling, or allegedly telling to do so, could be destructive.  
 
Today, energy security and the climate change are the key drivers of the energy policies. 
Although, energy security has been a focus point for more than three decades now, climate 
change has recently gained rapid momentum and became a truly global concern.  Climate change 
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challenges every single country to act responsibly and take appropriate measure to limit their 
greenhouse gas emissions. Long before, questioning a country on their GHG emissions has seen 
as interfering in the internal affairs of that country but today, we know that climate change is 
global as it affects every living species on the planet. For example, the EU takes a great 
responsibility and ensures the reduction of GHG emissions through legislations and directives. 
One of them includes “European 2020” targets which are legally binding for every member state 
with the aim of increasing the renewable energy input and the energy efficiency by 20%, and 
reducing the GHG emissions by 20%.    
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Chapter 2 
The Role of International Organizations in Energy Security 
 
2.1. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Energy Security 
 
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is an organization consisting of 
12 members that hold 2/3 of the world’s petroleum reserves. The objective of OPEC is to unify 
and settle on oil policies that are favorable to its member states. In the essence of these policies, 
it is important see that the petroleum exporting countries are keen to secure fair and steady 
commodity prices (Ramady & Mahdi, 2015). However, this is not a one-sided trade and for this 
reason, it is critical to offer importing countries a fair deal by taking their economic variables 
into consideration.  
There are several characteristics of energy security that lean on the core of international trade. 
Some are listed in accordance with the speech of OPEC Secretary General, El-Badri, A., S., 
(2008).: 
 Energy trade is reciprocal; 
 Security of demand (suppliers) is as important as security of supply (consumers); 
 Security is always crucial and time does not change this fact; 
 All the parties should ensure the security of energy resources;  
 When trading energy commodities, there shouldn’t be any discrimination among 
countries and the trade should concentrate on the eradication of energy poverty along 
with the continuous procurement of energy services; 
 Energy security should benefit from the constant dialogues and cooperations between 
the stakeholders.  
Security of demand is as important to producers, as security of supply is to consumers. OPEC 
has supplied the market well over the years and hold enough spare capacity in case of 
unexpected supply disruptions. Spare capacity is substantial due to the fact that the market 
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demand for oil always increases and it is critical to keep the market well-supplied because it is 
vital for the healthy functioning of an economy (Ramady & Mahdi, 2015). 
OPEC members and other small oil producers are also concerned about the costs associated with 
oil field exploration, drilling, exploitation, refining and so many other activities due to the 
expensive nature of energy harvesting and it is important to mention that all the costs associated 
with these activities have to pay off as soon as possible for the producers to maintain their daily 
business operations.  
OPEC also takes energy efficiency measures serious. If both the producers and customers take 
energy efficiency measures, energy costs can be diminished and this will have a positive impact 
on the economies. Producers can have more spare capacity and supply the market for a longer 
period of time and customers can enjoy the abundance of energy resources and pay less for 
everything. However, this doesn’t mean that OPEC members and other producers are not 
concerned about the future oil consumption trends because if renewable energy becomes 
widespread then there is no place for fossil fuels in the market. Some of these countries simply 
rely on the cash flow coming from the fossil fuel sales and if there is no longer demand for their 
services, then there is no economy left (Ramady & Mahdi, 2015). 
Saudi Arabia as the largest and most dominant player in OPEC, it spends millions of dollars to 
protect the oil fields, infrastructure, trade routes and energy installations. The Secretary General 
of OPEC, El-Badri, A., S,. (2008) described energy security as a two way street and listed the 
points below:  
 “It should be universal, applying to rich and poor nations alike, with the focus on the 
three pillars of sustainable development and in particular the eradication of poverty; 
 It should focus on providing all consumers with modern energy services; 
 It should apply to the entire supply chain. Downstream is as crucial as upstream; 
 It should cover all foreseeable time-horizons. Security tomorrow is as important as 
security today; 
 It should allow for the development and deployment of new technologies in a 
sustainable, economic and environmentally-sound manner; and 
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 It should benefit from enhanced dialogue and cooperation among stakeholders.” 
 
OPEC belives in timely investments in infrastructure and observes the market carefully before 
making sure that the financial resources are not wasted instead they add value to the business. If 
these investments are not made at the right time or adequately, OPEC can lose its market share 
and power. OPEC has to secure a large market share in order to manipulate the industry and give 
it a direction. In order to succeed in this strategy, sometimes OPEC ventures its income from the 
sales for the sake of its market share. This strategy adds an extra burden on several OPEC 
members because below a certain price, some of them can not afford to continue processing 
crude oil and oil products.  
According to OPEC’s World Oil Outlook 2014, OPEC will spend approximately $10 trillion for 
oil and related invesment projects between 2014-2040. There are still cities, towns and villages 
with no access to electricity and around 2.5 billion people simply rely on biomass. These 
locations and their dwellers will create a whole new market for OPEC in the near future. OPEC 
looks forward to secure sufficient energy resources for all these new markets (OPEC, 2014).  
OPEC involves in events that are aimed at exterminating energy poverty. Strong cooperation is 
vital to achieve this objective. OPEC finds it important to sustain a consistent dialogue with the 
regions and countries so that everyone can meet their energy security targets. OPEC is expected 
to play a crucial role for a longer period of time due to its significant influence in the world 
energy markets. Both the customers and the producers can enjoy a fair trade if everything is done 
transparently. Also, it is important to keep the market well-supplied and maintain a sufficient 
spare capacity along with a strong dedication to engage every stakeholder in the talks in order to 
eliminate energy poverty.   
 
2.2. International Energy Agency (IEA) and Energy Security 
 
International Enegery Agency or the IEA is an independent organization which has the objective 
to guarantee clean, affordable and reliable energy for its member states. The core interests of the 
IEA are energy security, economic development and environmental awareness. The initial 
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thought behind the formation of the IEA was to co-ordinate a collective response to emergency 
situations related to energy when founded in 1974. International Energy Agency follows and 
analyzes the global energy trends, creates common grounds for energy technology cooperation 
and promotes sound energy policies (IEA, n.d.). Also, the IEA recognizes the importance of 
engaging other countries such as Russia, China, India and Brazil in its operations even though 
these countries are non-member states. The IEA investigates every aspect of energy security and 
promotes policies that are likely to improve reliability, sustainability and affordability. Below 
information is retrieved from the International Energy Agency (n.d.).  
The four main areas of IEA focus are: 
 “Energy security: Promoting diversity, efficiency and flexibility within all energy sectors; 
  Economic development: Ensuring the stable supply of energy to IEA member countries and  
promoting free markets to foster economic growth and eliminate energy poverty; 
 Environmental awareness: Enhancing international knowledge of options for tackling climate 
change; and 
 Engagement worldwide: Working closely with non-member countries, especially major 
producers and consumers, to find solutions to shared energy and environmental concerns.” 
The U.S. Department of Energy (n.d.) praises the work and contributions of the IEA. Information 
below is retrieved from the official website of the U.S. Department of Energy (n.d.).  
  “Emphasizes the importance of and analysis on short- and longer-term issues in all key energy 
supply and demand sectors. 
 Maintains a robust collective security coordination mechanism (first and foremost for oil) that 
evolves over time in response to evolution of the global energy market. 
 Undertakes analytical work on climate, energy efficiency and energy technologies, and policy. 
 Has multiple mechanisms that facilitate substantive interaction with partner countries. 
 Coordinates closely with other international organizations that have synergies with the IEA 
program of work and budget. 
 Serves as a convener and leader of international cooperation on energy research and technology 
(e.g. through Implementing Agreements). 
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 Provides the platforms and resources that facilitate access to and exchange of high quality data 
and expertise.” 
2.2.1. The IEA's Role in Global Energy Security 
 
The IEA membership urges countries to save oil stocks that can run up to 90 days after a possible 
supply disruption and fix up on an emergency response mechanism to react collaboratively if the 
incident of supply disruption is severe. The mechanism (as seen on figure 1) includes stockdraw, 
demand constraint, boosting domestic fossil fuel production and fuel switching (OECD & IEA, 
2014). 
Figure 1: IEA emergency response system 
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2.3. NATO and Energy Security  
 
NATO does not clarify the definition of energy security since the definition varies for different 
countries. However, NATO made it clear that the organization recognizes the importance of 
energy security and there is a consensus on the participation in energy security measures and 
energy efficiency of military forces as of 2012. Several NATO member states created the Energy 
Security Center of Excellence (ENSEC COE) in an attempt to equip NATO with expertise and 
member states support the organization on energy security issues. ENSEC COE also provides 
trainings in energy security development for military members and organizes hands-on military 
exercises.  
 
It is important to clarify that NATO is not an energy think tank; however energy issues affect 
everything from a to z; especially, contemporary energy policies and current energy 
developments gained momentum on the track of a less dependent future. Shale gas boom in the 
United States and the increased trade volume of LNG might raise new maritime security 
problems. Some fossil fuel rich countries might experience low profits due to unstable energy 
commodity prices and diminished export volumes. Russia is one of those countries that are left 
behind to confront with market uncertainties after the Ukrainian crisis (Ruhle, 2014).  
The Western world imposed an embargo on Russia because Russia has jeopardized the interests 
of the NATO allies. There weren’t any serious attempts by the Western world to cease the 
Crimean conflict besides the embargo; however the West is afraid that if Russia make a decision 
to raise the natural gas prices, extremely dependent European economies including France, Spain 
and Italy will be in trouble and there is a high chance that the West would experience a recession 
which may worsen their weak economies and the EU in general.  
 
 NATO’s aim is to carry out collective military defense against those who pose a danger to the 
members. As the history showed, energy can be used as a weapon. NATO members share 
intelligence and support each other in times of difficulties. Supply disruptions cause one of those 
difficult times that require strong co-operation and politics to handle the situation and NATO’s 
confidential setting allow members to support and relieve from the troublesome conflicts. NATO 
usually relies on international energy organizations or think tanks for a clear roadmap that could 
help them to resolve conflicts in a timely manner (Esakova, 2012). Energy issues directly involve 
22 
 
all the member states since natural resources are scattered around the globe and those countries 
which are gifted with commercially valuable resources usually sustain unstable politics and 
involve in military conflicts.  
 
NATO is aware of the importance of energy security and expresses its desire to add the subject 
to its core setting. The initial state of publicity may include in-house energy training programs 
for the diplomats and representatives in order to canalize the importance of the subject to wider 
audiences. NATO can also increase the awareness of other states on natural resource competition 
and climate change; thus countries like China and Brazil might also pay attention to renewable 
energy technologies which can reduce their dependence and place the exporting countries on a 
stage in the world politics that is no longer as important as before (Esakova, 2012). Resource 
exporting countries do heavily rely on the importing countries as their economies majorly 
dependent on their exports so this situation can bring stability and fair deal.  
 
2.3.1. Protection of Energy Infrastructure 
 
Most of the threat comes from direct hostile attacks to the energy infrastructure both in the 
exporting and importing countries along with the facilities. Our energy infrastructure is aging as 
the technological developments require more complex system integrations and computerized 
mechanisms to control (Ruhle, 2014). Also, the energy routes are clearly visible to everyone 
since most of them are fixed and used daily to transport the goods. There are several “choke 
points” which receives most of the hostile attacks and NATO is aware of all the weaknesses and 
consequences (NATO, 2015). It is easier to control the energy routes that are on land; however 
maritime routes are difficult to control due to natural circumstances. Oil tankers are attacked by 
the hostile parties on these maritime routes and the stolen commodity is used to finance more 
other attacks or to feed smaller hostile parties to employ them for future conflicts and sustain 
their chaotic existence. Besides, these hostile parties also pay close attention to cyber systems 
that are used for the surveillance and control of the complex energy systems so all the member 
states are vulnerable from this aspect as well; apart from the physical disturbance.      
 
Everything related to energy is under attack. For example, the facilities in Iraq and Syria are 
changing hands continuously. Saudi Arabia and Qatar employ strong security measures but they 
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are still exposed to enormous threats which could be disastrous both for them and NATO 
members. Even though, politically speaking, NATO members and the Gulf States do not share 
many interests, they are bound to cooperate on such circumstances. An attacked oil pipeline and 
facility in the Gulf States can rapidly increase the price of energy commodities around the globe 
and this circumstance can affect the lives of billions (Edmonds & Cerny, 2004). If such conflicts 
arise and the commodity prices rise, everything we need to sustain our lives would get more 
expensive and this would literally lower our living standards. This happens due to the fact that 
the goods need to be transported from somewhere to somewhere and transportation requires 
fossil fuels. It gets more expensive to produce a good since this is going to be reflected on 
electricity prices by the producers and distributors; this will lead to job cuts. People will have to 
pay more on their bills which will lower their purchasing power. Globalization brought us to a 
situation that whatever happens in the other part of the world is more than capable of affecting 
our daily lives even though we are far away.  
 
Energy will never lose its importance. People need to be provided with energy to sustain their 
lives. Countries form alliances to avoid any conflicts of interest and in times of conflicts with the 
outsiders or non-members, the alliance takes collective defense to correct the situation. For 
example, the embargo on Russian products affects the Russian Federation in terms of 
competition and trade. Some Russian state-owned energy companies had already signed up 
contracts with several European and American companies to exploit natural resource fields in the 
Siberian region because Russia itself did not acquire the necessary technology to accomplish the 
procedure (Oxenstierna & Tynkkynen, 2013). However, all these agreements reluctantly 
suspended for a while. Russia kept providing natural gas to Europe and recently new agreements 
have been achieved by several major European energy companies with the Russian Gazprom. 
People might wonder how this could happen. Foreign politics on energy simply employ the 
greater interests of the nations which are obviously beyond the Ukrainian crisis. Russia is strong. 
Russia is fossil fuel rich. Russia is a good trade partner. NATO, in such circumstances involve in 
the conflict resolution by offering grounds for talks. NATO sees military defense as the last 
employable option (Oxenstierna & Tynkkynen, 2013). Finally, Russia accepted to double the 
capacity of the Nord Stream pipeline to deliver gas to Europe through the Baltic Sea, bypassing 
Ukraine.  
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NATO members import most of their energy from the countries outside the alliance, and some 
countries which play a crucial role in the production and transportation phase concern the 
member states. As in the example of Ukraine, transit countries are exposed to disruptions or 
could cause disruptions due to conflicts. NATO can play a crucial role in regards to emergency 
planning, resolving a conflict and providing expertise in crisis. NATO can strategically align 
appropriate measures depending on the circumstance and apply those measures timely. NATO 
can appoint teams to ensure the freedom of navigation in the maritime and land routes. Also, 
NATO can meditate on the energy related scenarios and produce resolutions for all of these 
scenarios in case if they are actualized (Esakova, 2012). When NATO’s intervention is 
necessary, there should be a joint agreement on the need and NATO’s political influence should 
be used over the talks before appointing a military presence in cases of crisis. NATO’s practices 
should involve partner countries and international organizations to exercise a safer energy trade 
tradition. This situation demonstrates that NATO is not only a self-interested organization but 
also values other nations’ interests.  
 
NATO’s intention should be the promotion of best practices on the protection of critical energy 
infrastructure. This involves an indirect approach to the subject and NATO should respect any 
discrepancies among the member states. NATO should train and employ competent staff and 
share its expertise with the private sector (NATO, 2015). NATO can also safeguard the member 
states if the critical choke points and sea lanes are protected from the pirates or hostile attacks. 
 
2.3.2. Raising Strategic Awareness 
 
There are several game-changing events took place recently. One of them is the shale gas boom 
in the United States and increased trade of LNG (Ruhle, 2014). If the United States decides to 
trade their domestic shale gas, they will have to find a route to ship these commodities. There 
will be more maritime security concerns as the route is going to be used more often. Strategic 
cordination of members will be sufficient to conserve the safety of the route and allow 
transporters to move contentedly. A full consensus on how to approach energy is possible by 
information sharing, political and strategic consultation and the legistlation of new NATO 
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policies. A good govarnance of NATO on energy is possible if the member states actively co-
operate with the partner nations on the technical details of the supply routes and volumes 
(NATO, 2015). NATO can raise the strategic awareness of renewable energy developments and 
promote the developments in the emerging countries. If NATO involves directly in energy 
related events, the unit that is going to be responsible for energy management will have a busy 
schedule to handle.  
 
2.3.3. Energy Efficiency in the Military 
 
The United States army has announced their intention to be oil free by 2040. By 2016, the United 
States Air Force intends to use biofuels for at least 50% of its domestic flight needs. The 
praiseworthy dedication of the U.S. military comes from the use of biofuels. The U.S. Navy had 
executed drills with their vessels and aircraft carriers which were run with biofuels (Ruhle, 
2014). The U.S. Air Force had carried out plenty of domestic drill flights in which their aircrafts 
are filled with biofuels. NATO members should examine the ways to increase the production of 
unconventional fuels such as biofuels, biogas, green diesel and algae-based biofuels. Some 
NATO members are more advanced in technology than others and the advanced ones should 
share and help others to test the promising technologies such as the fuel cells or smart grids. 
NATO members may later settle over an agreement to zeroize all their environmental footprint 
by switching from traditional fossil fuels to renewable energy and opting for electrical 
transportation systems (NATO, 2015). A member state should promote the photovoltaics and 
small home type wind electric systems for electricity and subsidize the cost of these devices. In 
the near future, renewable energy promotion can bring enormous benefits for the wealth of that 
society. Also, the member states should create or heavily subsidize biofuel plants, photovoltaic 
and wind farms, tidal power systems and upgrade all the hydropower stations and work on such 
technologies which does not require the drainage of rivers or simply any sort of interruption to 
the nature.  
 
2.3.4. Energy Efficiency of the NATO Forces 
 
Majority of the NATO missions take place in remote locations and require the soldiers to remain 
in those locations for some duration. Troops are transported through the convoy routes in various 
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settings. The duration of the operations could be long and access to fuels can be cumbersome. 
Camps that are set to host the soldiers might run on photovoltaic and portable wind turbines. 
Hummers can be converted into fuel efficient vehicles. To sum up, upgrading military 
technologies that are owned by NATO can reduce casualties, improve energy efficiency, reduce 
fuel costs and contribute to the environment and raise the awareness for climate change. 
 
2.3.5. Summary 
 
NATO will sustain its presence for the security of its member states. The organization has to 
engage non-member states in order to acquire any information that could later be essential. Also, 
forming partnerships outside the Alliance facilitates communication as this is done collectively 
and allows any confrontation to be resolved immediately. Plenty of conflicts that interest NATO 
are actually engaged with energy related issues. NATO has attended direct talks with several 
Middle Eastern governments (Ruhle, 2014). These talks were concentrated on the threat to oil 
fields and the potential consequences. Caspian Sea region often names NATO as a close ally in 
the face of Russian influence. NATO’s intention is to build close ties with the Caspian Sea 
region countries in order to extinguish the Russian influence on their politics and free will. 
NATO may promote the EU investments on the Caspian Sea region countries and build the 
grounds for sharing intelligence and expertise. This strategy does not have to isolate Russia. 
Russia should always be considered a partner and the dialogues should be sustained. If NATO 
could find a common ground for the interests of both Russia and the EU, then Russia can be a 
crucial part of the European energy diversification strategy and diminish the European 
dependence on the Gulf Region. It is more advisable to speak pleasantly rather than acting 
unfriendly because this would bring no help. The EU and Russia together can ensure the safety 
of energy infrastructures and pipelines effectively. The EU prefers a market based approach to 
the security of energy supply rather than a military based approach. At least in the context of 
politics, this is how it looks like.  
 
Energy diversification is a crucial step towards a less dependent Europe and understanding 
Russia is essential for this purpose. Russia might have convinced Iran to cease its nuclear 
program quicker than the West if Russia wasn’t penalized with the embargo. However, due to 
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the sanctions, Russia found itself in talks with China; another major player in the world politics. 
China and Russia do share similar interests, and both are key trade partners for the Western 
world.  The European governments are afraid that NATO’s involvement in energy talks might 
send wrong signals to the Gulf States and Russia. However, this shouldn’t be seen from such a 
perspective because NATO here would only be appointed to communicate the members’ interest 
and demands (Ruhle, 2014). As doing these talks individually can take plenty of time, these talks 
should be organized by the alliances or organizations that incorporate several countries.  
 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are dependent on Russia as a transit country for their shipments to 
the West and the Russian Federation has observable influence on these countries. Achieving 
close ties with Russia seems to be the best option for a healthy foreign politics and trade. 
Moscow may not pressurize the Caspian Sea region countries and unstable Middle Eastern 
politics would be condemned by all the parties in case of conflicts. NATO can be an 
irreplaceable part of energy talks in the future.  
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Chapter 3 
Economic and Political Dimensions of Energy Security in the European Union 
 
3.1. The European Union’s Energy Security of Supply Policy 
 
The European Union has to meet its internal energy demand requirements in order to sustain a 
certain economic growth. Even though, escalated energy efficiency measures and reduced energy 
intensity in consumption has positively affected the European Union, the demand for energy 
resources is still increasing. The European Union is the second largest energy consumer after the 
United States. Almost 18% of the world’s energy is consumed by the European Union. The 
European Union member states have limited energy resources and meet the majority of their 
demands through oil and natural gas imports from abroad. To be exact, the EU’s energy 
dependency is at 53% as of 2015 (European Commission, n.d.). Historically, the European 
energy dependency used to be around 40% in the 90s. This is due to the fact that primary 
production in the EU declined and even though, the energy markets are penetrated with RES, the 
demand for fossil fuels did not lose its importance. The EU’s import dependency is expected to 
be 67.5% in 2030.  According to Eurostate, the most energy dependent member states are Malta 
(104, 0%), Luxembourg (96, 9%), Cyprus (96, 4%) and Ireland (89, 1%). The least dependent 
member states are Estonia (11, 9%), Denmark (12, 3%), Romania (18, 6%), Poland (25, 8%), the 
Netherlands (26, 0%) and the Czech Republic (27, 9%). In the mean time, Denmark has a 
negative dependency rate at -37% because the country is a net energy exporter (Eurostat, 2015).  
 
In response to 1970 crisis, the EU had replaced oil with different energy resources in several 
industries. However, no matter how much our technology has developed since the 70s, the 
transportation industry still relies on oil or petroleum more than any other resources. Oil has 37% 
share in the EU’s total energy consumption. The EU imports its oil from Norway (11%), Russia 
(33, 5%), Middle East (40%), North Africa (11%) and the rest from the small producers 
(European Commission, 2014). 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU has intented to reduce its dependence on 
OPEC exports by increasing its trade with Russia. Ever since, Russia plays a significant role as a 
29 
 
key energy exporter. The EU is forecasted to import 84% of its natural gas demand, and 93% of 
its crude oil demand by 2030. Oil imports account to 3% of the European Union’s GDP per 
annum. However, oil dependency differs from natural gas dependency. The EU is expected to 
remain as the largest oil importer until 2030. Natural gas is the least polluting fossil fuel among 
all other fossil fuels and that’s why this particular energy resource is at the core of European 
energy policies; it helps the EU combat climate change and sustain an economic growth.  
 
Natural gas is the second most consumed energy resource after oil with a rate of 25% in the total 
net consumption chart (European Commission, 2014). Based on the forecasts, around 2.5% 
growth in natural gas demand is expected every year. The oil wells in the Nordic Sea yield lesser 
quantities of oil each and every year and the European internal energy market simply can not 
fully rely on that. It is no surprise that the EU’s demand for natural gas from abroad will 
increase. Russia, the Gulf States and small producers like Algeria account to 20% of the imports.  
 
Like the majority of the states, the EU member states possess large reservoirs of coal. Coal has 
an historical importance for the EU. At the heart of the European Union, the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) lie. The treaty of Paris allowed this community to be official and the 
treaty is signed by Germany, Italy, France and the Benelux countries. The main coal producers in 
the EU are Germany, Britain, Spain, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia (IEA, 2008). Coal 
accounts to 17% of the total domestic energy consumption in the EU.  
 
Due to its environmental impact, coal is not seen as a preferable energy resource; even though, it 
is in abundance and cheap compared to oil and natural gas. Compared to other fossil fuels, coal 
consumption in the EU decreases every year. This is an EU-wide policy; however this doesn’t 
prevent the European scientists to investigate new technologies that may allow coal to be utilized 
in a way which is 100% clean and cheap. The future demand for coal depends on our 
technologies that can significantly reduce or fully prevent carbondioxide emissions (EurActiv, 
2010). 
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Nuclear energy had been an inseparable part of the European industrialization similar to that of 
coal; however there were also criticisms over the use of nuclear power. Europe has signed the 
Euratom Treaty in 1957; the treaty that established the European Atomic Energy Community.  
There are currently 185 nuclear power plants in the EU. Almost 27% of the energy came from 
nuclear power plants and 49.8% came from combustible fuels such as coal, oil and natural gas in 
the EU as of 2013 (Eurostat, 2015). Public opinion in Europe is negative for the use of nuclear 
energy. However, it is up to the member states to run or phase out nuclear power plants. 
Chernobyl incident raised awarenewss of the dangers of nuclear power in Europe in the 90s and 
several member states such as Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Belgium chose to 
phase out nuclear energy. Nevertheless, Europe had reconsidered switching to nuclear energy 
due to high energy costs and improved security measures in the nuclear power plants. For the 
first time in the history, European Commission members have expressed their supporting 
opinions on nuclear power in October, 2007. The European Commission members initiated 
further discussions over the use of nuclear energy. It is strongly believed that the European 
Commission made profound provisions on its nuclear strategy because the newly-joined or 
recent members were heavily dependent on Russian energy and this had to be changed so the 
European Commission promoted nuclear power for the new member states.  
 
The European Commission requests its new member states to give them a permission to regulate 
the power plant standards and act as the competent authority on behalf of the state. Several EU 
member states find it important to build new nuclear power plants in the next 25 years, such as 
France, Great Britain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Switzerland, Lithuania and Bulgaria. 
Some other member states preserve their negative approach towards nuclear energy such as 
Germany, Sweden, Belgium and Spain. The rest of the member states are in dilemma. Most 
likely, the rest of these countries will decide upon building power plants based on their success 
or failure to produce electricity from renewable energy resources; energy efficiency and energy 
conservation rates (Yergin, 2006). Renewable energy accounted for an 11, 8% share in the 
energy mix of the European Union. The EU had revised its energy policies during the summit on 
March, 2007 and by the proposal of the Commission, there were several targets set for the 
renewable energy penetration in the market. In this context, until 2020, the EU has to increase 
the share of renewable energy to 20% in the net energy consumption and this has to include 10% 
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share of biofuels in transportation. Energy efficiency also has to be increased by at least 20%. 
The 2020 targets of the EU are assertive and the EU member states have to make an endeavour 
to achieve these targets. The 2030 targets aims to reach 27% share of renewable energy in the net 
total consumption. However, there is a belief that the EU will not be able to achieve these 
objectives and the basis for this belief is due to the failing efforts of the major member states 
since the 70s. Some of these industrialized countries had initiated programs to increase the share 
of renewables in the energy mix but they couldn’t succeed (Yergin, 2006). 
 
3.2. Determinants of the Energy Security Policies of the European Union 
 
The European Union has been influenced by the energy crisis that occurred in the 1970s. Rising 
oil prices along with the recessions caused high inflations and affected European economies 
adversely. Until 2000s, some regions of Europe were not concerned with the issue of security of 
supply. While the world energy markets were following a steady course, the discoveries in the 
Nordic Sea brought resilience to Europe and emphasized the importance of energy diversity. The 
worst supply shortage or disruption happened during the first Gulf War; after then, the EU did 
not experience long-lasting shortages until now (McGowan, 1996).   
 
The changes in the world energy markets starting from 2000 led to structural changes and 
increased the European concern on the security of energy supply issues. Problems with the 
global energy markets jeopardize the world’s largest energy importer, the European Union. At 
the heart of the supply security problem, Russian and the European gas trade remains. The EU 
member states need a reliable natural gas supplier; however once again, with the recent Russian-
Ukrainian conflict, Europe is worried about potential shortages. The discrepancy of natural gas 
trade stipulations between the Russian and the Ukrainian authorities back in 2006 was a strong 
warning for Europe to immediately take precautionary measures before it happens again.  
 
The major suppliers use energy as a political tool to dictate their requirements to the importers; 
the force may come in the form of price, quantity, volume and frequency. This proves that the 
energy markets are fragile. The Russian-Ukrainina Conflict in 2006 was due to the disagreement 
arising from natural gas prices and taxes. Russia sold 1000 bcm/year gas for $60 to Ukraine but 
later intended to sell it for $100. The EU found this event hostile because the Western-friendly 
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Ukraine was pressurized by Russia and the EU started to questions its diplomatic and economic 
relations (Belyi, 2015). As we see today, the EU and the U.S. has adopted and imposed sanctions 
against Russia; covering almost all the industries in response to the annexation of Crimea by the 
Russian Federation. Even though, the U.S. was against to a possible European and Russian 
natural gas cooperation in the 70s, the European leaders collaborated with the Russian authorities 
and the Russian gas started to flow (Belyi, 2015).  
 
Since the time when Europe received its first natural gas delivery from the Soviet Union, the EU 
had seen Russia as a reliable associate until the Ukrainina Crisis burst. Russia as the natural gas 
supplier has managed to become a quasi monopoly for the European Union and this occurance 
had not been perceived as a dangerous situation until recently (Belyi, 2015). Russian attitude was 
perceived hostile for the second time when Estonia decided to remove the Soviet War Memorial 
in 2007. Tallinn is the largest port in the Baltic Sea region and this port was heavily used to ship 
and transfer Russian oil to Europe. However, when public was introduced with the news of 
moving the statue of a Red Army soldier, Russians were offended and immediately retaliated by 
ceasing oil transfer to the Estonian port. Russians simply claimed that their railroads were under 
maintenance; and commenced to ship oil directly from the Russian ports.  
 
The strategy to give the priority to Russian ports was determined by the current Russian 
government but it is believed that this strategy was pending and executed when the EU’s 
political objectives started to change (Aalto, 2008). The European Union had arrived in the 
conclusion that Russia is more than capable of using energy to extinguish European consensus 
on politics and vandalise the solidarity between the member states. The milestone for the radical 
changes came after this incident and the security of energy supply has become another priority. It 
is important to buy energy at an affordable price as much as physical accessibility.  
 
In order to intensify its defence against Iran, the U.S. built missile defence systems in some of 
the Eastern European countries; encouraged Georgia, a former Soviet Union republic to 
participate in events organized by NATO and supported Ukraine to participate in the EU 
membership talks. Russian and the European politics were strained under the influence of the 
U.S. politics (Aalto, 2008). In this context, Russia expects the EU to be supportive for its foreign 
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policies and energy here becomes a tool to acquire that support. For example, Russia’s political 
relationship with a particular country forms the basis of its natural gas price for that particular 
country.  
The Figure 2 maps the gas prices in Europe as represented on Radio Liberty (2013):    
 
 
As listed on One Europe (2014), “Belarus pays the lowest price of 166$ per 1.000 m³. Its 
neighbour Poland pays the highest price in the EU - 526$. Germany buys more gas than any 
other European country and pays 379$, while France pays - 394$. The most expensive gas in all 
of Europa is for Macedonia - at 564$.” Russia usually claims that the prices differ due to the cost 
of transportation and other economic variables but in fact, the prices have to do with its political 
relationship. If the energy importing country hands over its energy infrastructure to Russian 
energy corporations, this literally means lower energy prices (Aalto, 2008). Eventually, the 
hostile attitude of the Western countries towards Russian energy corporations leads to costly 
energy prices. 
 
Figure 2: Gazprom's Grip: Russia's leverage over Europe 
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In the next 25 years, the European demand for natural gas is going to increase. In addition to this, 
the demand is going to increase more in the developing world and this will lead to stiffer 
competition for this particular product. Especially, the growing demand in Asian countries risks 
the European energy market. The Caspian Sea region is so precious that the European Union and 
China compete for the natural gas reserves in this region. There is another ground for 
confrontation by the virtue of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) share in the global energy markets. 
LNG makes it easier to transport gas to everywhere and it has expanded the scope of the trade 
which means stiffer competition for the EU. Russia and Norway found a way to export their gas 
in liquid form to North America. LNG price in the U.S. affects the LNG price in the EU. This 
economic relation between the two continents will be stronger in the near future (Wood, 2012). 
 
On the contrary to 1990s, today, the European Union came across with energy exporting 
countries that pursue national energy politics and have a visible force on the EU along with other 
regional markets. These exporting countries have the power to price their own products as 
distinct from the other exporters and can compete for certain amount of market share; exactly 
like Russia. The EU is mostly concerned with the co-operation between the exporting countries. 
Especially, since the time when two major gas suppliers, Russian Gazprom and Algerian 
Sonatrach agreed to co-operate, this news found a broad repercussion in the EU due to the belief 
that this co-operation can lead to the creation of a natural gas cartel that may compromise 
Europe’s energy security (Harris, 2015). 
 
It is no longer a theory; Gazprom involved in the exploration of hydrocarbons in Algeria and 
won the development rights announced by the Algerian National Agency for the Valorisation of 
Hydrocarbon Resources in December 2008. Gazprom also signed a contract to participate in the 
El Assel oil and gas project in the eastern part of the Algerian Sahara, in the Berkine oil and gas 
basin which is valid until 2039. Gazprom is the project operator, owning 49% of the shares and 
Algerian state oil and gas corporation Sonatrach, which has 51% share, acting as the partner and 
co-investor of the project (Gazprom, n.d.). 
 
There are speculations about Russia’s tendency to create a natural gas cartel with Iran and 
several other countries similar to OPEC. In 2008, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) 
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was held in Doha, Qatar and the possibility of forming a cartel was further discussed. Algeria, 
Qatar and Russia were the ones to lean towards the possibility (Macalister, 2008). Eventually, 
the importance of sustaining close relations and strong co-operation were emphasized during the 
event.   
 
In order to ensure the reliability and sustainability of the European energy security, multinational 
cooperations also undertake a substantive role. Royal Dutch Shell Oil and British Petrol are 
among the supermajor oil and gas corporations originated in Europe.There are state owned 
petroleum and gas companies from the emerging economies like China and India raising the 
stakes for the competition of the market share in the energy industries and diminishing the 
influence of the major players.     
 
The U.S. foreign politics and economic interests in the Middle East and Asia, where energy 
resources are concentrated heavily, determine the future of the European energy security of 
supply. Instable Middle Eastern politics and the regime shifts jeopardize the European 
economies; however this risk is not as big as it used to be in the 70s. Chinese prestige in the Gulf 
region is more visible than before and the Western influence is reduced (Andrews-Speed, Liao & 
Dannreuther, 2002). Eventually, the European energy scenarios are no longer viable due to the 
conflict of interests.  
 
On the other side, climate change hasn’t found its place in the Chinese and American energy 
policies. China is the most polluting country in terms of greenhouse gas emissions and the U.S. 
takes the second place. The consequences of a possible 2 degree Celsius climate change are 
obvious and every country recognizes the importance of acting early and adopting preventive 
measures. However, some are reluctant due the cost of shifting from polluting to eco-friendly 
industries. The EU combats the climate change and tries to prevent the potential consequences 
before it is too late. This particular part of the world sets the most promising targets to lighten the 
heavy burden of pollution on our ecosystem and the EU member states are the most determined 
countries to adopt climate change policies so far.  Energy and climate are parallel to each other 
and cannot be held separately when discussing the climate change. It is known that the most 
vulnerable countries in case of an increase in temperature are the fossil fuel rich countries 
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(Redcliff, 1993). The oil and gas exporting countries are most likely going to experience social, 
economic and demographic crisis along with instability due to the climate change. In this 
context, it is no surprise that the supply coming from these countries will be inconsistent as a 
result.  
 
The poles are melting slowly and making it possible to explore energy resources in places that 
once accomodated harsh conditions. Competition for the energy resources in the poles will result 
in conflicts. Those who claim possession on the poles also risk the European energy related 
interests in the region. In this scenario, the Western world might have to cope with the worsening 
energy security of supply dilemma; this means rough competition for the supply can cause 
anxiety (Redcliff, 1993).  
 
3.3. The Development Process of the EU-wide Energy Strategies 
 
Energy security of supply issues obliged the EU member states to co-operate. The only obstacle 
for the EU was to compromise on a harmonized or an integrated energy policy. Energy was at 
the heart of the European Union when it was founded. The European Coal and Steel Community 
and the European Atomic Energy Community were to address the urgent need of energy in the 
Western Europe and lay the foundation of extensive co-operation that can prevent or minimize 
the risk of war in Europe. The European Union made an incredible effort to compromise on a 
mutual energy policy. During the 70s, there was no mechanism to cope with the oil crisis. With 
the initiation of the United States, International Energy Agency was established in 1974 in 
response to OECD-based oil crisis and eliminated the EU-wide mutual policy deficiency.  
 
International Energy Agency aims to respond to all sorts of energy related questions - not only 
oil crisis. Majority of the time, member states actively managed to co-ordinate their energy 
policies under the roof of the International Energy Agency (IEA) without seeking advice from 
Brussels. After the crisis, most of the energy agreements in the EU were reached during the IEA 
meetings. By the late 1980s, the EU had attempted to leverage its power in the energy sector; 
especially the term, “sustainable development” was introduced for the first time in the World 
Commision on Environment and Development’s Brundtland Report as “sustainable development 
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is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs (Drexhage, Murphy & IISD 2010). The report contains two 
key concepts as stated by Burton (1987):  
 
 “the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which 
overriding priority should be given; and 
 the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on 
the environment's ability to meet present and future needs." 
 
However, the “Single European Act” treaty did not include a chapter related to the mutual energy 
policy when it was published in 1987; the domestic market was foreseen to be completed by 
1993 in this treaty. Disagreement is due to the divergence of opinions between the member states 
(The Single European Act, 1986). During the 1990s, energy policies were discussed all over 
again and by the end of the 90s, the member states built consensus on three perspectives. The 
first perspective was to build a strong domestic market in the European Union by stressing the 
importance of fair competition. The second perspective was about the formation of a mutual 
environmental policy by taking into account that the fiscal measures and financial status of 
member states would be the key determinant factor of such a policy. The third perspective was 
about the European Energy Requirement which has the purpose to support and promote free 
market economy in the former Eastern Bloc countries; thereby strengthening and contributing to 
the European energy security of supply (Aalto, 2008).   
 
Domestic market oriented strategy affected the industrial structure of the energy markets and in 
the key energy markets, public sector and the state had to cope with the new sequence of values. 
Withing the scope of environmental issues, the European Union’s leading role in the 
actualization of Kyoto Protocol and the implementation of an EU-wide carbon emissions trade 
mechanism were important developments for the domestic market. However, the result was 
disappointing because the developments did not yield the expected outcome. Until the end of 
1990s, Europe couldn’t agree on a mutual energy policy. In 2000, Green Paper - Towards a 
European strategy for the security of energy supply was published by the European Commission; 
however it did not contain an integrated and comprehensive approach to energy policy. The 
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absence of a mutual energy policy in 2000 caused the EU to lose its negotiation power and no 
further discussions were planned for this issue (European Commission, 2000).  
 
The preparations for the mutual European energy policy started in the mid-2000s. The consensus 
of including a mutual energy policy along with strategic targets in the European Union 
constitution reached; and under the Article (3-256), energy policy targets are mentioned (O'Neill, 
2009). Even though, the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe was signed in Rome on 29 
October 2004, before entering into force, it had to be approved by all the member states and 
some did not so the ratification failed. The intention for drawing up such a constitution was to 
replace all the founding treaties of the European Union with a mutual constitution. To be 
specific, the reforms in France and the Netherlands were the main reasons that caused the failure 
of the attempt. Later, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009 after having ratified by all 
the member states in accordance with their national constitutions.  
 
At the Hampton Court summit, under the influence of the energy crisis between Russia and 
Ukraine, the European Union member states agreed on the necessity of a mutual energy policy in 
2005. The European Council during the summit invited all the participants to draw up a brand 
new Green Paper. Concordantly, the European Council published the Green Paper for the 
purpose of supporting the procurement of sustainable, competitive and reliable energy supplies 
in 2006. The Council reemphasized the necessity to possess a monaural identity at the 
international stage. Even though, the magnitude and specific mechanisms were acquired within 
the European Union, it was claimed that political unwillingness hindered the co-operation. 
 
Following the publication of the Green Paper in 2006, energy occupied a precious role in the 
European Union’s agenda. By the approval of the European Union climate and energy package 
in March 2007, member states were officially mobilized for the common energy policy (The 
Council of the European Union, 2007). In addition to the EU climate and energy package, two 
other energy related packages were proposed by the European Commission, and adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. Before these packages adopted, the 
member states did not accept the energy chapters of the historical treaties such as the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Treaty of Rome; not even a single amendment made to authorize the European 
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Union bodies in the field of energy to act on behalf of the member states. Simply, the member 
states did not want to lose their free will in the decision making of their domestic energy policies.  
 
The 2020 Climate & Energy Package and 2030 Climate & Energy Framework are the first 
samples of energy related binding agreements to ensure the EU to meet its climate and energy 
targets for the year 2020 and 2030. The 2020 targets were proposed in March 2007 and accepted 
by the European Parliament in December 2008. The targets are translated into national targets so 
that each member state can check its own progress. They feature 20% reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions compared to 1990 levels; 20% increase in the share of renewable energy and 20% 
increase in energy efficiency. It is also worth mentioning that 3% of the EU’s GDP is planned to 
be invested in energy related research and development programmes. This means better 
technologies can be employed in the energy sector. Several member states are close to reach 
some of these objectives but based on current trends, we see that the EU ETS did not yield the 
desired results because it failed to promote low-carbon technologies due to the current carbon 
market prices. In Deloitte’s Energy Market Reform in Europe report revealed that the EU 
significantly reduced its energy and carbon intensity but the economic crisis has undermined the 
process. End-user electricity prices rose by 20% between 2008 and 2012 but the wholesale prices 
were dropped by 35-45% at the same time. Energy dependency has increased slightly in the EU 
since the policy adopted; this is not the desired outcome of these targets. However, the EU is still 
the only great economic power that adopted a new economic model which is less carbon-
intensive and more renewable energy focused (Deloitte, n.d.).  
 
Legal foundation for futher cooperation in energy industry is not profound in the EU; although, 
co-operation must be maintained in order to achieve demanding and compelling set of objectives 
that benefit all the member states. The idea of a single market requires strong co-operation along 
with reaching a consensus as a union on foreign economic relations, transportation and 
environmental policies. 
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3.4. The European Union’s Energy Security Strategies 
 
The European Union’s approach to energy security of supply up until the beginning of 2000 was 
about the imitation of the U.S. model. The model was seen sufficient to sustain a well-
functioning energy market in the EU. In addition to the market mechanism’s value system, 
sustainable growth and environmental concerns were taken serious to comply with the Kyoto 
Protocol. This approach found a concrete statement in the Green Paper - Towards a European 
Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply. With the publication of the Green Paper, the 
European energy security of supply issue was comprehensively discussed for the first time. The 
importance of curbing the growth in energy demand and the managing energy import 
dependency on a timely manner was emphasized. Public authorities were suggested to constitute 
energy security or security of supply policies and targets in line with the market principles. The 
paper underscored the significance of unification on energy policies because the member states 
individually were inadequate and had limited maneuver capability during the negotiations. 
Environment was one of the core points of the paper because energy production, transportation 
and consumption have major consequences on environment; future decisions on policies were 
suggested to stress the environmental aspect of the issues. Energy security of supply meant more 
than reaching a consensus but it required a strong form of constitutionalism. All the risks related 
to energy security were listed on the paper (European Commission,2000). 
 
The Green Paper of the European Commission (2000) lists the measures below to maintain an 
adequate level of energy supply: 
 
 completion of the internal energy market 
 taxation of the energy resources accordingly 
 application of the energy-saving methods and programmes 
 extensification of new technologies in energy industry 
 examination of mutual transportation policies  
 development and refinement of less or non-polluting energy resources  
 enhancement of the policies related to fuel stocks 
 sustentation of the competition policies in energy industry in order to avoid oil supply 
risks 
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 extensification of further dialogues with the fossil fuel exporting countries  
 fortification of the supply networks  
 
The Green Paper stressed the necessity of maintaining the ongoing communications with the 
south eastern neighbours because these countries are located close to Russia and the Gulf States. 
Even though, the organizational structure was weak, the Council of the European Union had to 
maintain a unified and strong attitude towards the supplier countries and use its economic and 
political power to shape the relations. Politics and economics were used with caution by the EU 
to have a strong bargaining power against the energy supplying countries. 
 
3.5. A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy 
 
After the Hampton Court summit took place, another Green Paper - A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy was published by the Council of the EU (2006) and 
for the second time, this has become the main energy policy support instrument. The paper had 
the intention to guide the member states for sustainable, competitive and secure access to energy 
resources. When published in 2006, the paper had three main objectives and these are:  
 
 to increase the energy security of supply in the EU 
 to choose the sustainable energy options  
 to improve the competitiveness in the domestic European energy market 
 
The Council of the European Union stressed the connection between carbon emission deduction, 
energy efficiency and energy security of supply issues in the Green Paper. The EU’s suggestions 
related to energy at the time were mainly focused on sustainability and it was perceived that an 
internal energy market could ensure the security of energy supplies. According to the Green 
Book, a liberalized and competitive energy market could help the investors to make correct 
decisions; and improves the security of energy supplies.   
 
The European Union’s energy security of supply objectives were mentioned as below (retrieved 
from the European Commission, n.d.).:  
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 to reduce the demand for energy 
 to diversify the European energy mix 
 to increase the share of domestically produced energy resources and the renewables in 
the total consumption  
 to diversify the geographic origins of the imported energy resources 
 to promote a market to meet the growing demand for energy through investments 
 to prepare Europe better for potential energy crisis  
 to ensure a backdrop for the European companies to compete for the global energy 
resources 
 to assure the European citizens and the European business market that energy is/will 
be always accessible 
 to compromise on a mutual foreign energy policy 
 
The new Green Paper focused more on the coordinated and mutual energy policy to ensure the 
energy security of supply; the old Green Paper which was published in 2001 did not emphasize 
these points.   
 
3.6. Issues with the EU’s Approach to Energy Security of Supply 
 
Enegy security appears high on the European Union’s agenda and as discussed above, co-
operation is the secret recipe for success. Due to obvious reasons, meeting on the common 
grounds for mutual energy policies took some time. The 2020, 2030 and 2050 targets proved that 
the European Union is highly aware of the urgent need to alter the current energy consumption 
trend. Switching to eco-friendly industries in order to avoid temperature increase of 2 degrees 
Celsius and providing healthy living spaces for its citizens are the main drivers of the European 
Union’s energy policies. Competition is the key to a healthy functioning economy in every 
industry; however when we evaluate the member states individually, it becomes clear that the 
Eastern European member states are less advantageous compared to the highly industrialized 
Western European member states. Ensuring a fair competition by law in the market was not 
sufficient in the beginning in order to persuade less industrialized member states to legislate 
these policies. Here, the Effort Sharing Decision comes into play. The decision establishes the 
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binding annual GHG emission targets for member states for the period 2013–2020 and it forms a 
set of policies and measures to combat climate change; progressing toward a low carbon 
economy as the ultimate objective will also benefit the energy security of supply.  
 
The targets vary based on the national wealth of member states. Greenhouse gas emission 
reduction by % 20 is binding for Germany but it doesn’t mean that Estonia also has to reduce its 
emission that much. If it can be done, it should be done. Some member states are actually 
allowed to increase their emissions by maximum 20% if reducing the current emission level is 
compelling and harmful for the national economy. However, it is binding to make efforts to 
reduce the emissions. Figure 3 by European Commission (n.d.) demonstrates the tolerated 
emission limits for every single member state. 
 
 
Figure 3: Member State ghg emission limits in 2020 compared to 2005 levels 
 
The European Commission systematically monitors all the member states and requires them to 
report their emissions. For example, low income member states are not requested to upgrade 
their facilities and implement carbon capture and storage technologies; and 2% of the EU ETS 
reserves are kept to be freely allocated to the facilities in these countries. To show their 
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solidarity, the EU agreed on allocating 10% of the EU ETS allowances to the low income 
member states.  The Effort Sharing Decision is valid until 2020 and later, all the member states 
have to reduce their emissions in order to reach the 2030 targets (European Commission, n.d.). 
By 2030, the member states have to ensure that at least 27% of the energy consumption has to 
come from the renewables. This target is binding for every member state and the member states 
are also welcomed to set more ambitious national targets. The figure 4 from Deloitte’s Energy 
Market Reform in Europe (n.d.) report illustrates the targets.  
 
 
Figure 4: European targets for 2020, 2030 and 2050 compared to 1990 or 2005 levels 
 
By the nature of the economic crisis, Italy, Spain and Belgium have already met their GHG 
emission targets. The UK and France are close to reaching the targets; however it is not sure if 
Germany and the Netherlands can make it to their targets. The European Union should ensure 
that the economic revocery will not alter the GHG emission levels in Italy, Spain and Belgium.  
 
Germany with no doubt is the pioneer in transition to renewable energy resources. For example, 
Germany made a committment to withdraw from nuclear power until 2022 in light of the 
Fukushima disaster in Japan. It is clear that phasing out of nuclear power plants threatens the 
objective to reach GHG emission targets; and raises the costs. To be more specific, withdrawal 
from nuclear power gives a birth to major risks for energy security; some of these risk affect the 
competitiveness of an economy and energy prices. Germans are committed to surpass the 2020 
renewable energy target by reaching 40% renewable energy share in its total consumption.  
Germany’s energy transition simply known as the Energiewende is estimated to require large 
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scale investments of up to 200 billion euros. However, the cost might vary in the near future 
because renewables cost less as the demand and the market grows for these technologies. Figure 
5 from the German Energy Transition of Morris & Pehnt (2012) reveals the ambitious German 
energy targets.  
 
Figure 5: German energy transition: high certainty with long-term targets 
 
German dependency on coal and nuclear phase out distresses the European authorities because 
the result of this pattern is likely to cause an increase in GHG emissions. Coal is abundant in 
Northern Europe and German authorities plan to build new coal-fired power plants. The 
Energiewende policy and the increase in coal use are contrary to each other (Morris & Pehnt, 
2012).   
 
The annexation of Crimea has triggered the longstanding worries about the reliability of Russia 
as a trade partner. The sum of the Russian energy policies in the recent years proved that energy 
is Russia’s top economic and political priority and is the basis of the country’s non-military, soft 
power in the 21
st
 century (Bochkarev, 2006). Previously, the EU did not take a stance against the 
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world’s largest crude oil and second largest dry natural gas producer, Russia. In the winter of 
2009, Russia ceased gas transfer to Ukraine and some member states had supply disruptions. 
However, this incident didn’t spoil Russian-European relations. Under the influence of this 
memory, the EU found the need to employ new strategies in case of repetition. The new strategy 
involved building pipelines to Turkey to keep the gas flowing in the future and the growing 
importance of energy security stressed as the 2009 and 2006 memories were recalled. The 
sharpened European attitude towards Russia turned into mistrust toward Russia as a trade 
partner. 
 
The internal energy market in the EU is affected by the international developments and trends. 
The shale gas and oil revolution in the U.S. might be a game-changer for the EU; importing 
around 53% of its energy from the Gulf States, North Africa, the Caucasus, Asia and South 
America. Some of these regions or continents are experiencing political instability and the 
history proved that energy can turn into an income source for dangereous affairs if it falls into 
wrong hands. The U.S. with a mature democracy plays a significant role in the European energy 
mix strategy. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) made it possible to transport gas across the oceans 
and it is affordable.   
The competition and demand for fossil fuels will have the tendency to rise significantly. This 
trend will continue because developing countries are starving for energy. Their economies are 
heavily based on fossil fuels and their national wealth with 6-7% growth per annum allows them 
to compete internationally for such resources. Due to all these reasons, energy markets will be 
more volatile and we should expect higher prices. Industrialized countries are not expected to 
fully run their economies on renewables when the anticipated scenarios above actualize. That 
means Germany might build stronger relations with Russia and the Gulf States if not as a part of 
the European Union in order to enjoy privileges; lower energy prices, no shortages, and 
consistency in procurement are just a few advantages. Central and Eastern European countries 
import around 60-80% of their gas and oil directly from Russia. Some nuclear plants in Hungary, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic and Finland rely on Russian fuel. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania serve 
as transit routes for the Russian exports and some of them depend on Russia's IPS/UPS, Unified 
Power System for a fully functionung electricity network.   
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Also, the energy crisis in 2006 was the milestone on the recognition of the vulnerable state of the 
European energy security. Later, set of energy policies adopted and further packages were 
reviewed and discussed for further developments. In the beginning, the only obstacle in front of a 
unified approach to energy security issues in the EU was by the virtue of member states having 
their own national energy strategies and linking energy issues to their sovereignty. The member 
states’ energy dependency, natural resource wealth, technological preferences and geopolitical 
positions differ and due to that their approach to energy security also differed from each other in 
the past. A state has the responsibility to provide energy consistently to its citizens and the 
industries, and ensure the security of supply. Because member states in the past perceived energy 
as a strategic tool, they did not want to hand in their free will to the European Union and its 
institutions. They wanted to take precautions with their own initiatives.  
Some of the precautions included military intervention in the worst case scenario. These 
precautions include the measures below as listed on market-based Options for Security of Energy 
Supply by Egenhofer, Gialoglou & Luciani (2004).  
 promotion of country-wide spread nuclear and coal-fired power plants which don’t 
require any external liaison 
 stocking sufficient quantity of imported fuels 
 supporting the national energy companies and their operations abroad 
 directly signing trade contracts with the producers 
 
Besides, majority of the member states followed a U.S.-like policy in the pursuit of energy 
security.  For example, there are two mechanisms for co-operation in case of energy shortages in 
the EU. The first mechanism is constituted and steered by the International Energy Agency under 
the leadership of the United States. The IEA's emergency mechanism requires member states to 
maintain oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days' worth of net oil import (IEA, 2014).  
 
 
The second mechanism was adopted by the Council of the EU. Compared to the IEA’s 
emergency mechanism, the second mechanism was found inadequate by the experts. The 
Council suggested maintaining oil stocks equivalent to 120 days’ worth of net oil import, 
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revising all the precautions and emergency measures and undertaking more respobilities in the 
surveillance of national energy stocks; however this request was unreciprocated. 
The EU still finds it difficult to substitute the ongoing traditional structures with its up-to-date 
systems and also, in determination of a political basis for the justification of the proposed 
systems, the EU remains insufficient. Therefore, the EU endeavors to compose energy security 
policies with the existing mechanisms. In this context, they discussed the options and concluded 
with the result that market liberalization and privatization are most likely the best options to 
insure energy security of supplies. However, there is always a need for a unified strategy because 
individually, the EU with its fragmented national markets is too small. In case if the EU can not 
manage to build its own internal energy market, powerful players like Russia and Saudi Arabia 
may always pose a risk (Esakova, 2012).   
 
The purpose of energy market liberalization is to deliver the best possible result in consideration 
with consumers’ rights, national economies and environmental impacts. The consensus on 
reaching energy security of supply objectives with market liberalization is based on the concept 
of free market economy. Probably, it is not hard to guess that the best way to serve consumers is 
to ensure that energy companies are privatized in a free market economy. This is the reason why 
the main objective of the European energy policy is to construct the desired internal energy 
market and protect the market from the arbitrary behaviors of the states which might be in 
tendency to manipulate the markets in their favor (Boersma, 2015). Since the 1990s, the EU 
meditates on the process of liberalizing the natural gas and electricity markets. The oil market 
was liberalized before natural gas and electricity markets. The liberalization of the natural gas 
market started with the introduction of the directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union on June 22, 1998. This directive aimed to gradually liberalize 
the natural gas market. The liberalization of the entire energy market and the complete 
integration of the domestic energy markets of the member states were supported by the 
publication of the directive 2003/55/EC on natural gas and electricity markets.  
 
There were new legislations passed to build a legal framework for cooperation between the 
international authorities; and energy related laws were prepared for a sound energy market. 
Later, more directives were published and all of them re-emphasized the importance of ensuring 
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security of supplies along with clarified steps. The directives have relieved the authorities from 
unnecessary complications and made sure that the natural gas market is up and running. Most 
importantly, the directives presented a common legal framework for the member states and 
helped them to see and check if the market is competitive, transparent and runs with no 
discrimination to any parties.  In light of this, the Gas Coordination Group was established to 
track and coordinate the energy security of supply measures among the member states. The 
Group also exchanges information on energy security with suppliers, consumers and transit 
countries (The Gas Coordination Group, 2012). The liberalization process in the EU was inspired 
from the U.S. experience but later, it was found very liberal and dropped.  During the phase of 
transition, the European Union member states were crawling to progress due to the discrepancy 
of governance between their energy companies; ownership status of their energy companies and 
dependency divergence on imported natural gas and oil which also affected the transition 
duration (Yergin, 2006).  
 
The old cartel structures of energy companies in some member states posed a danger for the 
healthy functioning of their own liberalized energy market. Majority of the member states 
effectively managed to unbundle the energy transmission networks. Also, these member states in 
the past supported and subsidized their cartels to hold sway over their energy markets (Lewiner, 
2010). Especially, the major economies of the EU such as Germany, Italy, Spain and France, to 
an extent, still support their hidden cartels; however this doesn’t mean that they are not 
liberalized. Actually, these countries are liberalized earlier than other member states. How we 
know these? Germany’s largest utility company planned to take over Spain’s largest utility 
company in 2007 (Milner, 2007). This historical event proved that energy industry, even in the 
boundaries of the European Union, still revolves around national interests; economic interets and 
the national security play a major role in the decisions. Creating large-scale national energy 
markets that can compete in the international markets conflict with the solidarity and competition 
foundations of the European Union.    
 
In the past, unwillingness of the member states to adopt the applications that can unify the 
fragmented energy markets bring about troublesome enery security of supply issues. However, 
that is no longer the circumstance. There is a mutual willingness to adopt EU-wide applications 
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that are supposed to bring prosperity to every member state and these applications create the 
basis of a good sample in terms of transparency, fairness, reliability, consistency and solidarity. 
This is how the EU, to an extent, helped the member states quit their past habits and provoked 
them to take a stance in energy security issues in conjunction with the European Union’s 
interests.  First, state-owned energy companies are reminded that they are legally liable to public 
and the legal basis for their obligations was constituted. For example, state-owned energy 
companies or cartels had to have stockpiles in case sudden disruptions or shortages; the purpose 
of the state here is to get off the hook immediately. Today, there is plenty of privately owned 
energy companies operate in the EU; and in case of energy shortages, they are prepared to 
activate their emergency measures.    
 
The positive criticisms over the fragmented energy markets of the member states simply relied 
on the alleged advantage of operating in a less liberalized energy market actually delivered 
cheaper energy prices in the past (Amineh & Guang, 2012). The advocators of this claim have 
compared the very well liberalized British energy market and the less liberalized French energy 
market. It is obvious that the end users in Great Britain are paying more for their energy bills 
compared to French consumers who have been enjoying relatively low and stable energy prices 
(Boersma, 2015). Currently, the majority of the energy drawbacks are external affairs-centric and 
the EU finally has a clear vision and authority to address all the drawbacks. For example, the EU 
institutions try to eliminate potential long-termed bargains between individual member states and 
energy suppliers. In this context, market liberalization positively affects natural gas imports due 
to high bargaining power of the European Union. Most of the member states think that natural 
gas trade demands long term business relations because it requires costly investments for the 
infrastructure and processing such as building pipelines and power plants.   
 
Liquification of natural gas made it easier to trade this commodity; however customers need to 
construct special terminals to store LNG and build expensive plants to convert LNG into gas 
form.  Most of the long-term deals in the energy industry are based on trust and anticipated to 
carry on accordingly (Boersma, 2015). Most of the energy contracts lasted around 15 years and 
this prevented competition in the market. In the past, all the deals were long-lasting; however 
today, the European Commission finds it a false step to commit deals individually with a 
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resource rich country. This statement is of course valid for the European Union member states 
and does not set the pace for the non-EU countries. Short-termism was emphasized by the EU 
because this strategy is believed to be in favor of competition. The criticism for the short term 
strategy is not missing. Most of the critiques claimed that only the major energy producers may 
agree on short term deals or trades and this circumstance can undermine the energy mix strategy 
(Boersma, 2015). Also, the major energy corporations defended the hypothesis that new 
pipelines and infrastructure can not be built if there are no long-term contracts. 
 
What scares the member states most is the hypothesis that Russia might utilize the natural gas 
demand as a part of a geopolitical puzzle that can ruin all the business relations. For the purpose 
of avoiding the EU claimed repressive applications of the Gazprom’s quasi monopoly market 
strategies, the EU stresses the importance of market liberalization and competition policies. 
Consequently, it is no surprise that the EU authorities support member states that are in transition 
to liberalized markets. The EU belives that establishing competition can reduce Gazprom’s 
market share in the European Union because this also means that energy prices will be in 
tendency to decrease and energy security will be ensured. In summary, this strategy has the 
intention to dissuade Moscow from pursuing an alleged repressive energy policy towards the EU 
under the roof of Gazprom. 
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Chapter 4 
The European Union’s International Relations With a View to Energy Security 
 
4.1. EU-Russia Energy Relations 
 
Russia has the world's largest proven reserves of natural gas; the 8th largest oil reserves and the 
second largest coal reserves; while also the second largest oil exporter and largest oil producer. 
(GECF, 2015). It is important to note that Russia is not an OPEC member. The strategic 
significance of proven energy resources comparatively outmaneuvers Russia. Energy industry 
means a lot for the Russian economy and its national security. High energy prices strengthened 
Russia’s political confidence at the international stage and economically improved its domestic 
market activity. Energy revenue meets half of the country’s annual budget. Natural gas and oil 
exports correspond to more than 80% of the Russian exports. From 1999 up until 2008, Russia 
experienced around 7% GDP growth per annum. This extraordinary growth was originated from 
the energy exports (Oxenstierna & Tynkkynen, 2013).  
 
The European Union’s demand for energy is expected to rise in the near future, and this demand 
makes the Russian-European relations more precious. The EU’s enlargement towards Central 
and Eastern Europe requires more concentration on Russia because both Central and Eastern 
Europe were heavily dependent on subsidized Russian energy supplies; the energy subsidies 
started in the Soviet Union. The crisis between Russia and transit countries led the EU to 
question its strategies to ensure energy security of supply in the long-run and examine if Russia 
could be a reliable energy supplier or should it remain as one also in the future. Especially, the 
Central and Eastern European authorities continuously imply that Russian politics create a 
serious threat to energy security in the EU. From March 2005 until January 2006, all natural gas 
supplies flowing from Russia to Europe via Ukraine was cut off. This incident repeated itself 
also in 2009, 2014 and currently, there is also no gas flowing. The first one was allegedly due to 
the conflict in settlement price. However, from the perspective of the Western experts, the latest 
incident is seen as the result of Ukranian proximity to NATO and the EU. It is believed that the 
annexation of Crimea has to do with the Ukranie’s intention to develop intimacy with the 
Western world.  
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After the previous crisis, in January 2007, Belarus and Russia couldn’t compromise on oil 
taxation. Before the incident, Russia did not charge Belarus with export duty or tax due to special 
bilateral agreements. However, it is revelead that Belarus had been taxing itself disguisedly and 
stealing oil from a major pipeline, Russia immediately freezed its ties and shut off oil exports to 
Belarus. In response to that Belarus slapped a $45 per tone transit tax on oil shipments from 
Russia. This resulted in a 3 day long shortage and Belarus gave up on the transit tax. Russia 
claimed that due the previous priviliges, Belarus has been costing $4 billion in lost revenue each 
year (BBC, 2007). Eventually, oil transfer to Europe was halted; threatening wider disruptions in 
Europe.  
 
Of all the coddling, the European Union’s intention is to maintain healthy relations with the 
natural gas cartel which they are dependent on. Due to Russia’s geographical proximity to 
Europe, and having the largest proven natural gas reserves within its boundaries, it is no wonder 
that Europe shows sensitivity when it comes to Russia. In 2013, some 33, 5% of the EU-28’s 
imports of crude oil and 39% of the natural gas imports came from Russia (Eurostat, 2015). 
These rates demonstrate that 1/3 of the total energy consumption in the EU is supplied by the 
Russian Federation. In tandem with the increase in energy demand, the European dependency on 
Russia is going to increase; although the EU has taken desperate measures to avoid similar 
occurances in the history. The forecasts demonstrate that in 2020, 50% of the imported oil and 
70% of the imported natural gas will come from Russia (IEA, n.d.).  
 
Europe is more in need of Russian natural gas than their crude oil supplies. Gazprom is in full 
charge of the natural gas trade. The state-owned company controls 90% of the natural gas 
production in Russia (Belyi, 2015). Russian-European natural gas trade occurs through the 
pipelines. For example, the Yamal-Europe pipeline runs across Russia, Belarus and Poland 
reaching Germany. Its length is more than 2000 km, and there are 14 compressor stations 
available along the pipeline (Gazprom, n.d.). The Nord Stream submarine pipeline links Russia 
and Germany with a length of 1,224 kms. It is the longest sub-sea pipeline in the world. The 
target markets are Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and some 
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others. The commencement was made on October 8, 2012 (Gazprom, n.d.). The figure 6 
illustrates the major Russian gas pipelines to Europe (Bailey, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 6: Major Russian gas pipelines to Europe 
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                                                             Figure 7: Energy security cacophony in Europe 
 
Energy dependence of the European Union member states vary. The figure 7 of OECD & IEA 
(2014) illustrates the cacophony between the member states. For example, Lithuania and Estonia 
are fully dependent. Finland with a well diversified energy mix still imports almost all of its 
natural gas and oil supplies from Russia. On the other hand, several Western European countries 
such as Sweden, Ireland, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal don’t import energy from Russia. The 
former Eastern Bloc countries still receive the majority of their energy resources from Russia 
(IEA, 2008).The Brits have a relatively low energy trade with the Russians. From the figure 5, 
we understand that Russia’s biggest Western European energy partner is Germany. Russia also 
supplied 39% of the oil demand and 36% of the natural gas demand in Germany (Fuchs, 2014). 
 
From this research, we find out that countries that import oil from Russia also have the tendency 
to import natural gas and vice versa. Also, the market share of the Russian oil exports is far less 
than the market share of the Russian natural gas exports. Another state-owned energy company, 
Transneft is responsible for the majority of the Russian oil exports to Europe.  
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Europe and Russia made efforts to build strong economic and political ties after the Cold War. 
The legal basis for the relationship between the EU and the Russian Federation was constructed 
by the establishment of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). The agreement was 
signed in 1994 and came into force in 1997. The agreement was planned to be valid until 2007 
but ever since, it is renewed. Russian exports were highly welcomed in the EU with just a few 
restrictictions; excluding the current Western embargo on Russian exports from the short-lived 
intimacy. The objectives of the agreement are listed in accordance with the Agreement on 
Partnership and Cooperation (1997):  
 
 Building a progressive framework in order to maintain a healthy state of political 
dialogue between the parties 
 Development of close political relations between the parties 
 Promoting active business operations between the parties 
 Integrating or harmonizing the economic interests based on the principles of market 
economy 
 Ensuring political and economic freedoms 
 Supporting Russia to consolidate its democracy  
 Strenghtening its economy to complete its transition into a market economy  
 Based on mutual interests, building concrete foundation for social, economic and 
cultural cooperation 
 Gradually widening the area of cooperation in Europe 
 Paving the ways for the future establishment of a free trade area between the parties, 
as well as providing the necessary conditions for bringing about freedom of 
establishment of companies, of cross-border trade in services and capital movements.   
 
Four core areas were identified for the PCAs at the St.Petersburg Summit in 2003. They were 
economy and environment, freedom, security and justice, external security and research, and 
finally, education and culture (The European Union, 2003). It took more time to build an 
institutive framework for the Russian-European energy cooperation. Russia and the EU intented 
to officialize their energy cooperation quests for the very first time by the announcement of the 
Energy Charter Treaty in 1998. However, the Russian authorities did not find several protocols 
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of the requirement appropriate for the Russian interest and did not approve the requirement. 
Especially, the conflict was arised from the transit protocol in the Energy Charter Treaty that 
suggested to transmit natural gas to Europe via third party countries. The transit protocol was 
claimed to force Russia to implement such measures that restrict them on the decision to choose 
the destinations to transfer oil and natural gas that may not comply with the Moscow’s interests 
(Oxenstierna & Tynkkynen, 2013). Russia was advantageous concerning the principle of energy 
transit. By not approving the requirement, Russia preserved the status quo. On the other hand, 
countries of the Caspian Sea were supporting the European Energy Charter Treaty but Russia did 
always remind them who actually is in charge of the pipelines which link them to Europe. 
 
As the Energy Charter Treaty caused disappointment in Europe, the authorities went in search of 
alternatives to maintain the energy dialogue with Russia. The alternative was immediately found 
in 2000 at the EU-Russia Summit in Paris. The dialogue has proved that Russia and the 
European Union are actually seeing themselves as partners in the energy industry and they have 
mutual interest to stimulate further energy security measures on the continent. The energy 
dialogue was aimed at contributing to energy supply and demand balance; promotion of the 
energy efficiency measures, including the production phase of these technologies, modernization 
of the transportation methods, simplification of the foreign investment procedures and building 
bridges between the producer and consumer countries. The energy dialogue was planned to be 
long-lasting and expected to have troubleshooting characteristics. The core mandate was 
obvious; connecting Russia to Europe. Integration of the Russian energy market with the 
European Union’s was believed to be achieved (European Commission, 2000).  
 
Throughout the period, there have been new amendments in order to strengthen the energy 
cooperation.  The European Union insisted on its desire to modernize the Russian energy 
infrastructure and support all the efforts made by the Russian-side in this context (Bochkarev, 
2006). The energy dialogue opened the doors slightly for Russia to cope with the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Energy Charter Treaty since it created a soft ground for all the discussions. However, the 
energy dialogue today is no longer functional. It is fully restrictred on the observation of the 
progressive reports of the energy efficiency measures and future projects.  Politics that rely on 
mutual understanding was lost between Russia and the EU; and without a doubt, in such 
circumstances, there couldn’t be any progress. Both parties have different comments and 
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priorities regarding the relations. In fact, the energy dialogue was simply relying on negotiations; 
Russians had to procure oil and natural gas and in return, enjoy its share in the European energy 
market. As a matter of fact, this has been the ongoing activity ever since the pipelines were built; 
doesn’t matter if the Russian authorities mind their European counterparts or not. Even though, 
there is an embargo on Russia, Central and Eastern European countries are in desperate need of 
Russian gas.  
 
The European Union expressed its desire to invest in the Russian energy industry if the 
circumstances were favorable; meaning that the Russian energy market was expected to be 
liberalized. The EU also intended to finance the competent Russian channels to modernize and 
secure the energy infrastructure. Several European and American corporations were actively 
helping Russian energy corporations to explore, drill and process energy resources that are out of 
reach; at least, it is not possible to extract these resources in remote areas by the current Russian 
technologies that are in use (Kramer, 2014). It requires huge investments and space-age 
technologies to drill. Mainly the sanctions banned the Western companies to support their 
activities in exploration or production from deep water, Arctic offshore and shale projects.  
 
In order to maintain its legacy, Russia may need to activate its long-expected restructuring of 
Gazprom; draft up-to-date energy policies; implement strategies to penetrate global markets; 
actualize a plan to diversify the trade routes and build privately-owned pipelines; develop 
efficient fuels and create energy balance; control the efficiency of subsoil stocks and also, 
comply with the European environmental standards along with Kyoto-like protocols. Until 2030, 
it is necessary for the Russian government to invest around $600 billion to its energy industry. 
The situation is more complicated than it looks like. Russia’s main trade partner is the European 
Union and due to the sanctions, trade is temporarily ruined. Russia does not acquire the 
technology to explore and drill remote oil or gas fields in Siberia. Oil and gas revenues are 
necessary to stimulate the Russian economy. It is also important to note that Russia is one of 
those countries that invest heavily in R&D. A possible Chinese-Russian cooperation in energy 
industry can eliminate the obstacles that were once relative to the situation. Also, building the 
desired technology from scratch is highly possible and these countries are more than capable.  
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Russia is a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an organization similar 
to the European Union. The SCO have emergency mechanisms in place to support the member 
countries that are in need of. This help may come in different forms such as capital, technology 
and defence. Help from the member states are in abundance. This organization is not the only 
source Russia can trust. Russia also has significant influence on Middle East and Africa. 
Through its membership in a large variety of networks such as Gas Exporting Countries Forum 
which may later turn into an OPEC-like organization, Russia has a saying for countries like 
Algeria, Egypt, Bolivia, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela, UAE and so on. At least one of these 
energy rich countries supplies natural gas, coal or oil to the European Union. Russian political 
influence on these Russia-friendly nations can be a game-changer and indirectly, Russia may say 
the last word in their trades with the EU (Russia Today, 2015). There are more scenarious that 
are not preferable for any parties. In situations like this particular one, it is always best to lighten 
the mood, mediate the parties that are in conflict and discuss the possibilities to weather the 
crisis. Sooner or later, the common path is found.  
 
The conflict is not only felt at the state level. Energy corporations like Royal Dutch Shell Oil and 
ExxonMobil hold billion dollar interests in the projects that are in the Russian Far East. These 
projects were halted due to the sanctions, threatening the investments that may be evaporated if 
not continued. This issue politically and economically concerns the American and the European 
interests. British Petrol also has unignorable amount of investments in the Russian oil industry.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 8: Arkutun-Dagi Oil and Gas Field, Sakhalin 1, Russia 
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The Figure 8 illustrates Gazprom Sakhalin Holding’s Arkutun-Dagi oil and gas field that is 
located 25km offshore Sakhalin Island in the sea of Okhotsk. This field was discovered in 1989 
and the production from this field started in January 2015. The facility is expected to produce 
90,000 barrels of oil per day from the well by 2019. There are two other fields – Chayvo and 
Odoptu – began production in 2005 and 2010, respectively. In conjunction with these two fields, 
Arkutun-Dagi will increase the annual production capacity of Sakhalin 1 by 32.5 million barrels 
of oil. The projected annual production from Sakhalin 1 project will exceed 10 million tonnes by 
2018. However, what is more important concercing the European and American interests in this 
project is the ownership structure. The partners in the Sakhalin 1 project are Exxon Neftegas 
(30%), Rosneft-RN Astra (8,5%), Sakhalinmorneftegas-Shelf (11,5%), SODECO (30%), and 
ONGC Videsh (20%) as listed on the Offshore Magazine (2015).  An American oil major holds a 
significant share of ownership in a Russian project with the estimated production capacity of 10 
million barrels of oil per annum. However, the Western sanction on Russia forced ExxonMobil 
to cease its operations completely in the Russia Federation (Russia Today, 2015). The fields 
surrounding the Sakhalin Island hold potential recoverable resources of 2.3 billion barrels of oil 
and 485 billion cubic metres of gas. The total projected investment is forecasted to be $10-12 
billion and the production may continue until 2050 if the expected consumption patterns are 
sustained. ExxonMobil’s loss will be unignorable if the sanctions continue.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
Figure 9: Sakhalin Island Map showing offshore oil platforms 
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According to International Energy Agency, if the investments in Russia are not made timely, 
Russia will have supply deficit and won’t be able to deliver the desired energy output in Europe. 
For this reason, the European Union verbalized its appetite to connect the European companies 
with their Russian counterparts in order to develop the energy reserves.  
 
In fact, first time the idea of Russian energy infrastructure corroboration was mentioned after the 
Cold War within the scope of Nordic expansion through Finland and Sweden. Both of these 
Nordic countries attempted to improve the energy relations and intented to link Russia to Europe. 
Other member states did not approve a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euro-Med)-like status 
to be given to Russia because they didn’t find a strategic interest. Following the European Union 
expansion through Central and Eastern Europe, they could no longer remain unresponsive to the 
necessity to improve the Russian energy infrastructure because the member states in this part of 
Europe are fairly dependent on Russian energy (Oxenstierna & Tynkkynen, 2013).  
 
Essentially, Russia and the European Union are partners but without equality. Big economic 
asymmetries give a birth to reciprocal dependency, stress the parties and most probably, would 
result in increased vulnerability of the Russian market power. Allegedly, Russia is in search of 
strategic tools like energy to put leverage on the European Union member states which might 
later yield economic profits and eliminate all the derangments. In this context, it is not surprising 
to hear such claims that Russia’s intention is to be the sole and only supplier of the energy 
starving member states of the European Union (Kuzemko, 2012). Russia has embraced a 
comprehensive strategic approach to energy related issues and the reference point to this 
approach is the national interests. Russian authorities monitor and wish to control the energy 
market developments in Europe. Some energy experts interpret this strategic approach as a way 
to deal with the American hegemony in the international energy markets. Majority of the energy 
related decisions, besides the official authorities are taken by the Kremlin, Russian government 
and a relatively small group of corporation executives. The decision making process is totally 
exclusive and far away from being transparent (Kuzemko, 2012).  
 
According to Kremlin, energy is so important that it can not be abandoned to market powers in 
energy industry like the corporations. This is the reason why majority of the Russian energy 
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companies are state-owned or directly controlled by the state. For example, in case of joint 
overtakings, due to the necessity of state ownership in energy related projects, it requires a 
troublesome re-evaluation process if foreign entities intend to buy a stake at an energy project in 
Russia. The aforementioned Russian company has to keep at least 51% stake in case of joint 
ventures or projects that are planned jointly. The negative public attitude towards privatization in 
Russia along with the state supported energy corporations resulted in the birth of powerful 
energy cartels. In this sense, Russian energy politics towards the European Union have a 
defensive voice in its core. Russia prevents the European penetration in its domestic market. On 
the other hand, the European Union also blocks the potential Russian expansion in the European 
energy market and demands market liberalization; produce strategies to exterminate Gazprom’s 
market power; requires Russians to sign the Energy Charter Treaty. Russian response to these 
strategies is so far successful. Both parties are in search of measures to protect their precious 
interests (Kuzemko, 2012).  
 
The EU is concerned with the recent developments in Russian internal politics and long-lasting 
state control on its energy industry. One can probably claim that Russian-European energy trade 
relations are reciprocal but it is asymmetrical. For example, energy shortages in Europe can 
result in economic devastations but any delays in the European energy bill payments to Russia is 
not the end of world because Russian stabilization fund can compensate the delay immediately. 
Even so, Russia is aware of the impracticability in this asymmetric situation and before 
completing the necessary investments in its infrastructure, the energy major maintains its 
friendly approach towards Western Europe (Kuzemko, 2012). Doesn’t matter how hard Russia 
tries, this doesn’t change the skeptic and prudent European approach to Russia’s future in the 
European energy industry. In this regards, the competent authorities are in quest for alternative 
resources and routes to diversify its energy portfolio.  
 
Russia usually does retaliate against hostile incidents. In response to European energy policies 
which nestle such intentions to sweep away the Russian influence, Russia strengthens its 
existence in the European energy markets because if Russia loses its market share in the 
European market, which actually is its most important trade partner, will be subject to extreme 
losses in revenue. Losing Europe is economically not tolerable. This threat leads to the 
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actualization of aggressive policies for the market share. For example, Gazprom primarily 
focuses on the European energy market and have a take in several energy projects in Europe.  
 
The most up-to-date Russian strategy is to develop bilateral relations with the member states on 
an individual basis. The theory claims that with bilateral agreements, Russia may do price 
discrimination and demand the highest possible price that a country can pay. Russia’s next big 
market is Western Europe. For this theory to come true the hunger for energy supplies in 
Western Europe has to increase but due to the recent economic crisis and due to the mature state 
of the Western economies, this theory is likely to fail (Perovi , Orttung & Wenger, 2009). The 
next big step is to make long-term energy agreements with the member states and build new 
pipelines. Thereby, restricted member states have to commit long-lasting trades and Russia 
actually hedges itself from monetary depressions for a long period of time. For example, partially 
state-ownned Austrian energy company, Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung AG made a long-
term natural gas trade agreement with Gazprom. This agreement helped Russian Gazprom to 
expand deep into Austrian natural gas transit lines and consolidated its hegemony in Europe.  
 
Russia, following its policy to make bilateral agreements, initiated another oil pipeline project 
with Greece and Bulgaria. The oil project is called Burgas–Alexandroupoli pipeline and planned 
to transport Russian and Caspian oil to the Bulgarian port of Burgas and from there to the Greek 
port of Alexandroupoli. Russia was going to be in full control of this pipeline in Europe but the 
project was suspended by the Bulgarian government due to environmental reasons and supply 
concerns. Gazprom and the Hungarian government agreed on the expansion of the Blue Stream 
pipeline project. Gazprom also signed an agreement with the Italian energy major, ENI on 
establishing a joint project company to do the feasibility studies and run the so called, “South 
Stream pipeline” jointly. The project was canceled in late 2014 due to rejections from the 
European Union and Bulgaria but basically, Ukranian Crisis and the Western sanctions on Russia 
played the most crucial role in the cancellation of the project. If it was to come true, Russia could 
have had his ticket to the second Western European country and could compete with the 
Nabucco pipeline which is supported by the European Union.  
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North European Gas pipeline was inaugurated in 2011 and connected Russia to Germany 
directly. The pipeline is operated by Nord Stream AG and its share holders are Russian Gazprom 
(51%), German Winthershall and E.ON Ruhrgas (both 15,5%), Dutch Gasunie (9%), and French 
GDF Suez (9%). The Baltic States and Poland lost the transit country status by the construction 
of North Stream pipeline. Russia was criticized by the former Eastern Bloc countries because 
this project allowed Russian authorities to act arbitrarily when these countries confront with the 
Russian interests. These are countries are faded from the energy scene up until recently. Poland 
happens to harbor a large quantity of shale gas. Even so, all the American energy corporations 
that invested millions and billions of dollars since 2009 are now quitting from the Polish energy 
market due to unsatisfactory results ('Gas and Power: Polish shale plans hit delays', 2013).  
 
According to some of the former Eastern Bloc and satellite countries, Ukraine-Russia Crisis in 
2006 was the proof of Russian strategy to utilize energy as a political weapon. Especially, Poland 
is highly concerned about the energy agreement they signed with Gazprom, compromising on the 
price until 2022. Despite this, Poland is worried about not receiving sufficient amount of natural 
gas. Russia planned to construct the second leg of the Yamal-Europe natural gas pipeline but 
dropped the idea in 2007. According to the Baltic States and Poland, this indecision was based 
on economical reasons. Russia also did not intend to rely on the European Investment Bank’s 
funds to carry on the construction (Conley & Rohloff, 2015). Besides, the Burgas-
Alexandroupoli pipeline project could have had devastating results if it was to be actualized 
because the privileged status of the other Eastern European states like Poland, Belarus and 
Ukraine would be lost. This particular pipeline actually contradicts the European Union’s 
policies that were associated with the reduction of the Russian energy imports. 
 
As most of the Eastern European countries lost their transit status, when Russia demands higher 
prices for their products tomorrow, complaints from these countries may not be taken serious 
since they lost their negotiation power. Claimants are worried about the possibility that Russia 
may manipulate the European vulnerability and blackmail if necessary. Another conspiracy 
theory claims that this has to do with Russian aspiration to monitor or control the former Eastern 
Bloc and satellite countries (Belyi, 2015). It is clear that Russia wishes to monitor the energy 
infrastructure across Europe and Eurasia in order to consolidate its market superiority. No 
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wonder why Russia takes over or acquires the refineries, pipelines and everything else related to 
energy infrastructure in the EU; revealing its monopolistic approach. Russian oil majors have a 
significant market share in the relatively new member states. The acquisition of the oil refineries 
and distribution companies in Central and Eastern Europe is a road to success. The trials of the 
Russian Transneft to take over an oil export terminal in Latvia and a refinery in Lithuania proved 
the above claims.  The governments of both states interfered in and did not approve the business 
transaction. Russia immediately retaliated by ceasing or cutting the oil transfer to both states.  
 
Since 2004, Gazprom has been investing in the shares of Estonian, Polish, Slovakian and many 
other countries’ energy majors, and the total investment added up to $2.5 billion; acquiring 
shares in 23 partnerhips. By the medium of energy corporations, Russians bought strategic 
infrastructure facilities in Hungary, Ukraine and Georgia (Belyi, 2015). What also worries the 
EU is the increasing Russian influence on the Caspian Sea region countries because these remote 
countries here are becoming allies of the Russian Federation. Turkmen and Kazakh governments 
signed innumerable agreements and most of these agreements are in the struggle of preventing 
oil transfer from the Caspian Sea regions countries to Europe; hindering the energy mix 
diversification objective of the European Union. By these agreements, Gazprom was endowed 
with the authority to act as the sales operator to Europe by the Caspian Sea countries (Belyi, 
2015). 
 
As a result of the unpredictable Russian strategic maneuvers, European member states adopted 
national energy policies and yet bloodletting the EU-wide energy security of supply applications. 
Especially, Western European states do not encourage Russia for the approval of the Energy 
Charter Treaty. Western states should advocate the coordination of the policies and if possible, 
draft some of them in conjunction with the Russians. This amicable approach does not have to 
melt the iceberg but for sure, it is going to be practicable and beneficial for both parties. As of 
today, we see that bilateral agreements are exclusively supported by several major economies in 
the European Union such as Germany.  The mutual energy policy idea in the EU was practiced to 
an extent at which major players or decision makers opt to stand by their own national interests 
(Boersma, 2015).  
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Former Soviet Union states demand the EU to activate the long-discussed energy measures to 
reduce their dependency on the Russian exports. This reasonable demand is based on the worries 
that are related to Russian influence at the international stage. At the core of the Central and 
Eastern European membership applications, their wish to become distanced from Russia 
remains.  Gazprom exercises its market supremacy in the Baltic States and Poland because they 
assume an opponent strategy towards Russia.  
 
In response to diversification policies of the European Union, Russia practices a strategy to 
diversify and disperse its exports to many other countries, and strengthen its position as a 
supplier. Especially, China and the other Asian countries are among the booming economies may 
squeeze or put their European counterparts into trouble if the competition for energy resources 
accelerates.  For example, Japan and China are potentially blossoming markets for the energy 
resources that are in abundance in the Russian Far East and the East Siberia. However, due to 
economic and technical reasons, it is not easy to steer and canalize the energy supplies to Far 
Eastern markets. Moreover, Asian markets contain economic and political risks. It is important to 
keep in mind that these markets are not as stabil as the European Union. 
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4.2. EU-Middle East Energy Relations 
 
European energy requirement necessitates strong economic and political relations with the 
Middle East. Oil crisis in the 70s, Iranian Revolution and the Gulf War revealed how fragile the 
European states are against energy shortages and later, the EU striked a prudent attitude by 
envisaging energy policies (Wieblitz & Comazzi, 2004). Due to geographical advantages, many 
of the Middle East states regard their progressive relations with the EU as significant. These 
relations were shaped by the geographical proximities and historical bindings. Following the Oil 
Embargo in the 1970s, the Middle Eastern countries played a positive role in the coordinated 
procurement of oil and natural gas supplies. Due to political tensions and wars, Iraq and Iran 
were the exceptions in the list of suppliers (Wieblitz & Comazzi, 2004). However, the Iraq War, 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Iran’s nuclear programme and many other events have been dragging 
the Middle East states to disaster and affecting the political and social stability in these countries. 
The procurement has also never become sustainable from these unstable countries. For example, 
after the Iranian revolution in 1979, 7% of the world production was lost and the Iran-Iraq War 
caused 6% of the world production to be lost. The table 1 below illustrates how Iranian oil 
production and consumption has changed between 1997 and 2010 (EIA, 2012).  
 
 
Table 1: Iranian total oil production and consumption, 1977-2010 
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The energy relationship between the Middle East and the European Union come to fruition via 
OPEC and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s collaboration. The Gulf States come to the forefront 
when we discuss the energy relations with the Middle East. Increasing growth in oil demand, 
dimished reserve capacities, uncertainties in the oil markets and fluctuating oil prices have all 
reinforced OPEC’s role in the international energy markets. As of today, approximately 40% of 
the European Union’s oil imports come from OPEC member (European Commission, n.d.). 
Estimates show that 50% of the European Union’s energy will be supplied by the OPEC member 
states in 2020.  This means that the EU will be more dependent on the Middle East for a while 
and will be subject to price adjustments that might be fragile for the vulnerable European 
economies. In this regard, the EU and OPEC made a decision to create high level bilateral 
dialogue in 2004. This attempt was conceived as an act to advance the European energy relations 
with the oil and natural gas suppliers (Nonneman, 2006).  
 
The objectives of the EU-OPEC dialogue are stready international oil markets and prices, an 
inviting investment environment, highly transparent energy market, better market analysis and 
market forecasts and finally, strengthening the international relations by technology exchange. 
The first ministerial level energy dialogue between the EU-OPEC took place in 2005 and ever 
since the meetings have been organized each year (Nonneman, 2006). According to the 
European Union, the developments in the oil markets have positively affected the mutual 
understanding process between the parties and highlighted the importance of dialogues. This 
relationship was not only beneficial for the two parties but also for the future of the international 
energy cooperation and establishment of dialogues.  
 
The EU emphasizes the importance of consistency, transparency and predictability of the oil 
markets for the interests of all the parties; highlights the necessity of demand and supply security 
(Bahgat, 2010). Concordantly, energy exporters and the European importers have to have 
bilateral communications apart from the one provided via OPEC-the EU dialogue. It has been 
discussed by the EU and several oil rich countries that oil prices around $100 are not good for 
any economy and agreed to manually reduce the prices to a reasonable level and eliminate the 
market uncertainties for the sake of their interests.  
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However, the relations are more complicated than it looks like. The EU is in demand of 
assurance for the OPEC’s future production capacity. On the other hand, OPEC criticizes the 
EU’s 2020 renewable energy plans and finds it unnecessary because this strategy will definitely 
cause uncertainties in the oil markets and prove that an increase in oil production capacity is 
actually unnecessary.  The EU’s aim to reduce its internal oil demand worries the Gulf States. 
Although, OPEC executes regional cooperation with the EU, they take the advantage of the state 
that the EU lacking a broad perspective on its approach to energy security of supply. Essentially, 
the EU prioritizes the bilateral energy relations with the member states instead of utterly 
embracing broad energy policies (Morata & Sandoval, 2012). Apart from OPEC, Gulf 
Cooperation Council provides the grounds for the Middle Eastern collaboration. The Gulf 
Cooperation Council consists of Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates.   
 
Narrowing international markets make the reserve capacity adjustments by the Gulf States more 
precious than before. In terms of geo-economic structures, the Gulf region began to relocate 
itself. There are three elements that shape the EU and the Middle East relations. The first element 
is the state that the Gulf Cooperation Council members hold the world’s largest oil and natural 
gas reserves when summed. The second element is the state that Saudi Arabia holds a big reserve 
capacity in order to protect the customers in case of temporary shortages. The third element is 
the state that the Gulf State canalized its efforts to penetrate the American and the Asian energy 
markets since the EU applies such energy policies that has the intention to reduce the European 
energy dependence on the region by cooperating with the Caspian Sea countries, Russia and 
North Africa. Obviously, the third element is amended due to recent events in Ukraine and Libya 
(Bahgat, 2010). Even though, the Gulf States do not export most of their products to Europe, the 
EU’s special interests with the region maintained its importance. For the global energy security 
of supplies, the Gulf States remain the keys for the success. The oil prices are determined based 
on the Gulf States’ decisions. The rising oil prices have significant role on the EU’s economy. 
The oil prices are in imperfect but steady relation with the natural gas prices so the negative 
impact grows as the oil prices increase. According to the International Energy Agency, the 
energy price increase in 2005 has lowered people’s purchasing power by 0.5% in the European 
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Union. However, this was not the only adverse effect. There was an EU-wide inflation surge by 
0,5 % (IEA, 2014). Furthermore, the EU’s interests in the region are sustained by the European 
energy corporations. These corporations play an important role in operation of oil and natural gas 
reserves in the Middle East. 
 
In 1988, the framework for economic and political cooperation is signed between the European 
Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council that seeks to improve trade relations.All the members 
of the GCC are classified as high income economies. Before the agreement, the GCC members 
were in search of plans to penetrate the European markets to sell their petrochemical products 
and the Europeans were looking for opportunities to secure their energy imports through 
frameworks; and the stability in the region was a priority. On 1 January, 2003, the GCC Member 
States established the Customs Union where a common external tariff of 5% was levied on all 
foreign imports.  
 
On 1 January, 2008, the GCC launched the common market and in 2003, the member states 
agreed on pegging their currencies to the U.S. dollar until the GCC for the Arab States adopt the 
so called “Khaleeji” as their single currency. Due to several obstables, the plan to switch to a 
single currency was shelved indefinitely. On 15 December 2009, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia met to establish the Monetary Council to introduce the Khaleeji as the single 
currency for the union. Yet, Oman and the United Arab Emirates did not approve the currency so 
the negotiations are still going on.   
 
For better cooperation, free trade agreements are prerequisite for all parties. The energy security 
anxiety in Europe accelerated the energy dialogues with the GCC member states. In this regard, 
during the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council summit in 2004, both parties 
agreed on eliminating the obstables and hastening the certain operations. The priority is 
obviously given to the energy cooperation. Several subjects like the human rights and 
immigration are left behind the doors with no results. Up until today, the EU and the GCC could 
not agree on the free trade agreement. However, the EFTA countries Iceland, Norway, 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland signed a free trade agreement with the GCC on June 22, 2009 in 
Norway. The agreement entered into force on July 1, 2014. The agreement covers the areas 
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including trade in goods, trade in services, competition and government procurement.  There are 
minor issues that have to be solved (Low & Salazar, 2010).  
 
The EU focuses its attention on energy issues with the GCC member states. There are three 
objectives behind the European interests. The first one is to increase the energy trade between 
Europe and the Middle East. In order to achieve this, free trade agreements are essentially 
important. Initially, the FTA has to be signed. The second objective profits every nation; it is 
about cooperating against the prices surges in the international energy markets and ensuring the 
stability in these markets. According to the EU, it is a must to operate in full transparency. In 
order to overcome the existing problems, the EU demands the right to be informed about the 
market conditions including the reserves, production and reserve capacities and reserve 
capacities. The third objective is about the development of the infrastructure network.  
Strengthened energy infrastructure contributes to the security of energy supplies (Ramady & 
Mahdi, 2015). 
 
For the well-being of the energy relations, there are some particularities that have to be included 
in the cooperation. These particularities include controlling the oil pricing mechanisms, jointly 
managing the reserve capacities and constructing pipelines between the EU and the Middle East. 
Also, there is an urgent need to compromise on free trade agreement Ramady & Mahdi, 2015). 
The EU proposed a similar memorandum of understanding to the GCC as it were achieved 
before with the Caspian Sea region countries. However, the GCC didn’t accept the offer and 
insisted on a proposal which comes with profound changes on other fields of trade. Until now, 
the GCC member states stood unwilling to accept the rules.  
 
Having member state like Saudi Arabia that joined the WTO and became a full member on 11 
December 2005, the GCC is far away from accepting the European style free market economy 
rules. The Gulf States claim that the EU invites the GCC to accept its own regional integration 
model without taking into account the Gulf States’ internal dynamics.  Also, the GCC criticizes 
the EU for too much depending on the rules when it comes to energy issues. The GCC also 
recommends a comprehensive and strategic partnership that will include a solution for the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is claimed to be the reason why the European attempt to offer 
72 
 
technical assistance, cooperation mechanism and systematic design failed. Energy related 
relations are restricted between the EU and the GCC member states (Colombo, 2014).  
 
The European diplomats are in favor of performing the region-based relations via the EU - the 
GCC partnership instead of conducting relations with OPEC. This is because during the EU – 
OPEC dialogues, OPEC members propose such topics for the agenda that are unrelated to energy 
(Colombo, 2014). In the past years, in despite of the substantial energy relations, the EU 
neglected its partnership with the Gulf States. The leading motive for such negligence is that the 
Gulf States have problematic energy relations with each other as well (Hertog, 2007:2). An 
institutive approach was found unnecessary because the Gulf States support a stable market 
merchanism and consistent prices, and avoid energy shortages as much as possible. However, 
profound relations are sustained through bilateral intergovernmental and intercompany 
agreements between the EU and the Gulf States. Also, it is important to clarify that the Gulf 
region is an important supplier for some EU member states but for some others, the Gulf region 
has no importance. Especially, the German authorities made it clear that it is absolutely 
unnecessary for Germany to import energy from the region. This approach is in accordance with 
the European 2020, 2030 and 2050 targets. Energy is probably the main factor that restricts the 
region to adop democratic reforms. 
  
Saudi Arabia receives the Western support in abundance due its role in preventing oil price 
fluctuations. For example, when evaluated within the European internal dynamics, oil against 
democracy relation is very complicated. The West sees some Middle Eastern states as reliable 
energy suppliers but when it comes to strengthening the internal politics and gaining national 
support, some Middle Eastern states like Saudi Arabia actually prefer to remain distant from the 
Western-guided approaches. For example, Saudi Arabia was worried about the political 
consequences that possible energy market liberalization could give a birth and opted out from its 
natural gas agreement with the Royal Dutch Shell Oil and Total. In fact, there were no serious 
attempts to avoid foreign direct investment in the Middle East. In return, the EU distinguishes its 
energy relations from the Gulf region problems. Consequently, friendly Middle Eastern energy 
approach to Western corporations is an important aspect of the energy security agenda 
(Colombo, 2014).  
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In order to achieve economic and social modernization, the Gulf region has to receive foreign 
direct investment to its energy industry and sustain progressive economic growth. Nonetheless, 
the political and social vulnerability of these states will remain in the future. Since the EU serves 
as a trade partner for the Gulf region, there is an observable growth in natural gas procurement. 
Liquefied natural gas made it possible to develop an intensified trade because this form of gas 
facilitated the transportation. Heavy concentration of LNG trade in Oman, United Arab Emirates 
and Qatar indicates that the reserves in the region will play a crucial role also in the future. The 
trio above mainly produces LNG for the Asian markets. Until the 2000s, the Gulf region 
supplied almost 5% of the European natural gas demand. Following the downfall in production 
costs, European energy corporations articulated their interests in the procurement of LNG from 
the Middle East.  
 
The large quantity of gas reserves here can meet the European demand in the future (Belkin, 
2007). Especially, Qatar shines out when it comes to European natural gas supply diversification 
policy. Even though, Qatar has a relatively small surface area and population, the country stands 
as the second largest natural gas exporter after Russia and the world’s leading LNG exporter 
since 2006 (EIA, 2015).  
 
The European Union imported 8.7% of its natural gas from Qatar in 2012. The European energy 
targets require less of oil and more of renewables in the consumption; natural gas is the most 
eco-friendly fossil fuel and there is a visible increase in the consumption in Europe. Due to the 
recent conflict in Ukraine, Qatar is expected to replace Russia. The expectations are in the 
direction of a 30% share of Qatar in the European Union’s LNG import (EIA, 2015). Italian and 
Spanish energy corporations were the first ones to sign LNG contracts with Qatar. However, 
there is an uncertainty on the side of the other Middle Eastern states that shelter natural gas 
except Qatar. It is believed that the best scenario for the European energy security is to buy gas 
from the Caspian Sea region and canalize the Iranian and Iraqi gas to Europe via Turkey. Until 
now, none of these states were close to satisfying the European gas market and had no initiation 
to do so. 
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Iran shelters 16% of the world’s proven natural gas reserves. Stability in Iran and its relations 
with the international organizations are precious for the European Union because the country 
holds the world’s second largest natural gas reserves after Russia. It is important not to confuse 
Qatar and Iran. Qatar is the second largest natural gas exporter and Iran has the world’s second 
largest natural gas reserves. It is not sure if Iran will build facilities and plants to satisfy the 
domestic market and export the rest. Natural gas is not easy to store so it requires consistent and 
timely investments. Iran meets 4% of the global oil consumption via OPEC; it doesn’t export 
natural gas (European Commission, 2014). In last 3 decades, Iran was not allowed to participate 
in the LNG trade and supply through the natural gas pipelines. Iran with its unutilized energy 
capacity might likely be one of the major gas suppliers of Europe in the next couple years 
(Steinhauser, 2015). The U.S. decision to lift the embargo on Iran is only the beginning of a new 
era for the Iranians. It is up to Iran to become a part of the energy market and their efforts will 
determine the country’s direction  
 
It is very obvious that the Iranian and the European relations are affected by the regional and 
political issues (Ganz, 2015). In the 2000s, the revelation of Iran's clandestine uranium 
enrichment program raised concerns that it might be intended for non-peaceful uses and received 
plenty of negative comments and criticisms from the international organizations. With reference 
to United Nationas, it was made possible to impose sanctions on Iran for the use of nuclear 
materials. This is how it was made impossible for Iran to invest in international pipeline projects 
(Ganz, 2015). The EU has been practicing such strategies to cease the Iranian nuclear program 
and on the other hand, Iran has been building strong political relations with the major energy 
producers such as Russia. Also, Iran used energy as a tool to demand political protection from 
China and India (Ganz, 2015). Because of such tensions, the enhancement of energy partnership 
beneath the rights based on agreements yield no results. Even though, the EU has not changed its 
attitude towards the Iranian disarmament, the region is highly aware and recognizes the potential 
importance of Iran as an energy trade partner. On the other hand, Iran claims that their use of 
nuclear energy lowers their natural gas consumption which means that there is more natural gas 
available for sale.  
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During such events organized by the United Nations and the European Union, Iran requrested 
technical European assistance in its energy industry and proposed to build long-term energy 
relations with Europe (Gloystein & Saul, 2014). The discussions on Iran lead to different 
directions in Europe’s energy policies. For example, the United Kingdom dissuaded Royal Dutch 
Shell Oil from investing in Iran and the French government supported Total’s investment plans 
in Iran for a long period of time. Italy and some other member states supported the Nabucco 
project which will transfer the Iranian natural gas to the European markets; however, the UK 
opposed to the official support of the Nabucco project by the European Union (Posaner, 2015). 
 
Iraq on the other hand, is believed to be an important energy player for the European Union; 
even though, the country holds natural gas reserves in small quantities. There is a big potential 
for Iraq to be a major energy player in Europe due to its physical proximity to Turkey (Erdem, 
2014). According to the European Commission’s declaration in 2004, the energy dimension of 
the European and the Iraqi trade relations has the utmost importance and there is a need for 
predictable conditions for investments in the Iraqi energy industry. Iraq may contribute to the 
European Union’s energy security. According to the EU, an increase in the production of Iraqi 
oil and natural gas will benefit both parties. It will benefit both parties if Iraqi energy industry 
adopts up-to-date energy policies that promote radical changes like market liberalization and 
stretch the investment area for investors. The EU could help the Iraqi to participate in the 
international energy markets (European Commission, n.d.). In this context, the EU granted 
approximately €800 million to Iraq and since 2007, the trade and cooperation negotiations are 
going on (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Iraq, 2015).  
 
Europe and the USA agree on the fact that in order to achieve high energy security, stability in 
the Middle East is a prerequisite; however, the methods and requirements to achieve the stability 
remain in suspense. The U.S. governments don’t hesitate to involve military in order to prevent 
further vulnerabilities that may ruin its energy security and secure the energy supply routes. On 
the other hand, the EU is unwilling to involve military and believes that market share and 
reciprocal dependence are the keys to energy security. The European public increasingly thinks 
that the energy dialogues between the EU and the Middle Eastern energy suppliers breed new 
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kind of radicals and drag the region into trouble because some of the money disappears in the 
black market (Luft, 2015).  
 
4.3. EU-Norway Energy Relations 
 
Norway is the European Union’s second largest natural gas supplier and third largest crude oil 
supplier. Nearly all the Norwegian natural gas is sold in the European markets. Short transport 
distance and well-built infrastructure ensure the Norwegian products to be competitive. In 2012, 
Norway supplied 31% of all the EU’s natural gas imports and 11% of its crude oil imports 
(European Commission, n.d.). Since 1990s, Norway’s energy policy has been in the direction of 
decreasing the energy production. This has enormous consequences on the European energy 
security; the EU is more dependent on the Middle Eastern, Caspian and Russian energy 
resources. Consequently, this event threatens the energy security in the European Union.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Oil, condensate and gas pipelines on the Norwegian continental shelf 
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 Norway supplied 42% of the United Kingdom’s crude oil imports in 2012 and 60% of the UK’s 
natural gas pipeline imports in 2013 (EIA, 2014). Additional gas exporters that are significant to 
the UK are the Netherlands and Belgium. Norway exports its natural gas and oil to Europe via 
the pipelines. The figure above shows the pipeline connections and the main hubs. Most of the 
oil and gas exports go to the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and Germany (Government of 
Norway, 2014). The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 25% of the world’s undiscovered oil 
and gas resources lie within the Arctic Circle. If the estimate is true, Norway will remain 
important in the energy markets. Therefore, the European Union involved in fund raising process 
for Norway to explore new fields (Eurasia Group, 2015). Norway as a stable and reliable energy 
supplier remains special for the European Union than other energy exporters. Norway and the 
EU share many similarities in the energy related issues. Norway is the EEA member state along 
with Iceland and Liechtenstein, and adopted the majority of the acquis. In bilateral energy 
relations between Norway and the EU, both parties are aimed at pursuance of coordination, 
maintainance of research and development activities in the energy industry, and conformance of 
energy politics toward non-European energy exporters (European Commission, n.d.).  
 
During the European Commission meetings, it was made clear that mutual trust and cooperation 
are important for both parties; they agreed on energy efficiency policies, renewable energy 
penetration, energy security of supply and cooperation in the field of energy production and 
research activities in the Arctic Circle (Offerdal, 2010).  
 
Depending on the pace of LNG trade, the European Union may find itself in competition for the 
Norwegian oil and gas with other non-European importers such as the developing countries in 
Asia. The U.S. plans to build an LNG facility in Europe in cooperation with the Norwegian 
energy giant, Statoil. However, there have been no negotiations yet on the subject and no 
commitments were made (Belkin, 2007). Although, such plans mean that the European Union 
will be in competition with the United States and other major players in the energy industry. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
 
The European Commission implemented measures to unbundle energy production and network 
operations from each other as of 2007. These measures were to prevent European energy 
corporations to turn into natural monopolies and restrict Gazprom from gaining more market 
share in the European Union. In the recent years, Gazprom acquired energy distribution 
companies in some member states and signed long term supply trade agreements with the 
authorities in Germany, Austria, Spain, the UK, Denmark, Italy, France, Hungary and Bulgaria. 
The deals gave a way to Gazprom to directly control the transition to distribution network 
systems in some member states. After all, Gazprom has been used as a political tool rather than a 
simple business entity by Russia. Therefore, the European Commission could only deal with 
Gazprom by manipulating the internal market mechanism (Schaffer, 2008). However, the 
internal market mechanism is not the only tool that the European Commission governs to restrict 
Russia. Russia prefers to sign bilateral agreements with the member states. The Commission 
obliges the member states to adopt the Green Paper on "Strategic export controls: ensuring 
security and competitiveness in a changing world” to restrict Russia from signing bilateral or 
unilateral agreements (European Commission, 2011). Up to now, the European Commission 
couldn’t achieve its objective because not all the member states fully supported or understood the 
external aspect of the energy security of supply but on the other hand, some member states 
developed an official framework to achieve the objevtive. Mostly, the troubled energy situation 
in Europe is agrued.  
 
The European Commission is aware of the fact that if the European Union couldn’t be like one 
fist to tackle the energy security, individually, the member states have a limited chance. In this 
Green Paper, these were stated: “Europe faces stiffer competition for the energy resources. If the 
European member states want to play an essential role in the international markets, Europe has to 
develop and embrace mutual foreign politics” (European Commission, 2011). Also, the 
European Commission issues a call for the mutual foreign politics and security policies to be 
prioritized. The European Union emphasizes that the energy security has to have both internal 
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and external dimensions; otherwise, member states are limited. Integration of energy targets with 
the third countries still maintains its importance.  
For example, the Green Paper on energy for Europe emphasizes these: “Energy must stand at the 
heart of the European Union’s foreign diplomacy. Energy has the utmost significance for the 
geopolitical security, economic stability, social development and combating with the climate 
change at the international stage” (European Commission, 2011). The European Commission 
elaborates the long-term benefits of a mutual foreign energy politics to receive support from all 
the member states. In this framework, the European Union underscores two different energy 
objectives: a well-functioning international energy market and the diversification of the 
resources and routes. According to the European Union, the best way to secure energy supplies is 
to maintain a well-functioning international energy market. In order to achieve the objective, the 
EU promotes the market rules and the principle of reciprocity. Another way to increase the 
security of energy supplies is to diversify the energy routes and supplies. In this context, the EU 
contemplates the improvement of delivery methods and the development of infrastructure 
(European Commission, 2011). When these objectives are evaluated, it is obvious that the EU 
has an optimistic manner towards the security of supply and belives that the international 
cooperation could actually resolve the downfalls of the issue (Morata & Sandoval, 2012).  
 
For example, some authorities believe that strong economic integration and trade with Russia 
could guarantee natural gas and oil supplies in the future. The EU’s cooperation-based energy 
security approach necessitates import and export activities, sustained energy dialogues between 
the transit countries, energy consuming countries and the private sector. Energy security of 
supply became distant from the traditional terms like producer-consumer reciprocality and 
dependency (Morata & Sandoval, 2012). In this context, there have been efforts on the side of 
the European Commission to issue new energy agreements; build partnerships with the supplier 
countries; establish dialogues and coordinate forums. For example, memorandums of 
understanding were signed with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan in the field of energy. 
Similar offers were made to Algeria and Egypt but the offers did not reach the objective.  
 
The European Union promotes regional developments in the South-East Europe with its Black 
Sea Synergy Programme. The programme encourages cooperation and partnership between the 
80 
 
Black Sea countries and creates common grounds to strive for the resoulution of political and 
economic problems that surround these countries. The EU strategy for Central Asia also carries 
the same purpose; to revive the energy cooperation in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions.  
The EU embraced the idea of partnership with the energy rich African states and also OPEC. 
Nonetheless, the efforts to improve the oil and natural gas infrastructure and the organization of 
alternative delivery and transportation routes accelerated by the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2011). 
 
In a nutshell, energy had no place in the European Union’s foreign policy agenda up until the 
beginning of the 2000s; as of today, energy has become the core issue in the foreign diplomacy 
and there are no dialogues that exclude energy issues. As discussed in the previous chapters, the 
EU had a difficulty in support of possible EU-wide energy policy unification. It was difficult to 
avoid member states to sign bilateral agreements with the producing countries and the EU had no 
authority on member states to steer their energy policies. One way or another, the EU had 
incoherent results with its official policies and tangible policies.   
 
The liberal energy principles create the infrastructure of the EU’s collective action plan which 
guarantees energy security of supply. With regard to this, the European Commission ensures the 
abovementioned objective by involving the non-EU states to accept several frameworks that 
include environmental targets, trade regulations and so on.  There are several foreign policy 
related instruments prepared to serve best for the European Union’s energy security interests and 
these instruments stress that there is an urgent need to convince non-EU states to participate in 
the international energy markets and benefit from its outcomes (European Commission, 2011). 
Thus, it is stressed that the EU’s partnership quest with the third world countries relies on the 
EU’s internal energy market rules and have the same principle basis. However, the research 
shows that the EU does not have the desire to export its own internal energy market rule but the 
dissemination of energy market liberalization is a common practice; this practice could be 
popularized if economic and political tools are used accordingly. As a result, the EU’s objective 
is to communicate its own energy market regulatory framework to the countries that are not in 
Europe and develop integrated energy markets that fully adopt and run on the same framework.  
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The dissemination of an institutionalized energy market regulation along with the distribution of 
liabilities and enhancement of transparency will serve the energy security of supply (Young, 
2007:18). The dissemination of the European internal energy market regulation ensures 
reengineering of the energy industries in the third world countries; appropriation of market 
economy rules; modernization of the energy infrastructure; improvement of private sector; 
contrustion of new regulatory framework and provision of the necessary reforms. The main 
reason to spread the idea of energy market liberalization and the regulations attached to that is to 
guarantee the energy security of supply; and also it is about obtaining the right to penetrate other 
countries energy markets, and increase the attractiveness of the market for the foreign investors. 
By doing so, energy production increases and countries have some spare capacity to export their 
products to ones that are in need. Moreover, liberalization makes the setting harder for the 
formation of energy cartels (Vona & Nicolli, 2014).  
 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) of 1991 is the first initiative to ensure the energy security of 
supply in the European Union by promoting energy market liberalization outside of the borders 
of the EU. This treaty is an international agreement which gives a birth to multilateral framework 
for international co-operation in the energy industry. The treaty includes energy efficiency, 
energy trade, transit countries and investment related affairs. The core idea behind the treaty is to 
integrate the energy industries of the Eastern European states and the Soviet Union with the 
West. The treaty is legally binding in order to promote the principles of market liberalization and 
to stimulate FDIs. The treaty was signed in Lisbon in December 1994 and officially became 
legally binding. The Energy Charter Treaty entered into force as of 1998. This treaty is the first 
economic agreement to gather the Soviet Union, European Economic Community member 
states, Japan, Australia, Norway, Turkey and Switzerland to co-operate in the energy industry. 
The treaty, under the principles of the World Trade Organization and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade serves as a solidarity mechanism and has the purpose to give a rise to 
liberalized international energy market. Probably, the best function of this treaty is its capability 
to mitigate the market risks.  
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There are 5 main provisions of the treaty as listed by the Energy Charter Secretariat (2015): 
 
 Protection and corroboration of the foreign direct investments (FDIs),  
 Empowering free trade of the energy raw materials, products and other energy related 
equipments,  
 Empowering free energy transportation via pipelines and networks,  
 Promotion of energy efficiency measures,  
 Mitigation of the negative impacts of the energy production and consumption,  
 Creation of a mechanism to resolve any possible conflict between investors and 
states.  
 
The Energy Charter Treaty, in the first step, started by putting across the idea of privatization of 
state-owned energy companies and licentiation of the third party access in the energy networks. 
The treaty confirmed that whatever the deal is about, states have the full national sovereignty 
power on their energy resources. Two crucial partners of the EU did not sign the treaty. The 
United States claimed that in bilateral investment agreements, this treaty is insufficient to protect 
the rights of the investors and did not sign. Russia, due to its disapproving stance against the 
transit protocol refused to sign. Allegedly, the reason behind the disapproval is that Russia did 
not want to lose its bargaining power and market share as the main transit country and the main 
energy supplier. Thereby, the efforts to constitute the Pan-European Energy Community 
remained weak due to Russia’s unwillingness (Aalto, 2008). Even though, the treaty remained 
unsuccessful, the European Union endeavors to dissipate the principles of the Energy Charter 
Treaty around the regions of the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Caspain Sea.   
 
The research shows that the best way to promote the regional cooperation, energy dialogues and 
new partnerships is to establish the so called “European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).” For 
example, it is claimed that the neighbourhood states and the partner states are going to take 
substantial roles in the EU’s energy markets.  The EU works with its souther and eastern 
neighbours to achieve its political and economic goals. This includes respecting the interests of 
all the parties; democracy, national legislation, human rights and social cohesion are some of the 
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mutual interests. The European Neighbourhood Policy is one of the EU’s main foreign policies. 
The co-operation encourages good governance of state, promotion of democracy, enhancement 
of energy security measures, implementation of environmental legislations, and reinforcement of 
economic and social developments.  The physical security of the neighbours is also considered 
important. According to the EU Neighbourhood Info Centre (n.d.), the negotiations mainly 
concentrate on:   
 Reinforcement of national legislation, democracy and respect for human rights 
 Promotion of market-oriented economic reforms 
 Promotion of employment and social cohesion 
 Co-operation on physical security practices  
According to the European Union’s energy security approach, energy could also be imported and 
exported as like other raw materials. In order to practice this approach, physical energy market 
orientation is a prerequisite. The EU-backed energy infrastructure projects aim at increasing the 
energy export. Especially, the projects that are thought to be an alternative for Russian energy 
imports are financed by the European Union. The primary projects are: The Interconnector 
Turkey–Greece–Italy (ITGI), Nabucco and Trans-Saharan gas pipeline. Also, LNG projects are 
funded and supported by the European Union. Some of these LNG terminals are planned to be 
constructed in Italy and Spain. LNG is/will be an important aspect of the European energy 
diversification policy (European Commission, 2014). 
 
The EU’s foremost pipeline project is the Nabucco pipeline. This pipeline, if constructed, will 
connect Turkey and Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. The pipeline will be capable of 
delivering 30 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas per annum. The diversification of 
delivery routes is a significant part of the European energy security (Rowley, 2009); that’s why 
there have been efforts to introduce the European energy policies in Turkey and the Balkans. 
These efforts are in the form of dialogues that are held frequently. The concrete grounds for co-
operation with these countries are constituted by the introduction of the Energy Charter Treaty. 
In this context, the Energy Community is established between the European Union and the 
neighbouring countries to extend the EU internal energy market in 2005. The Energy 
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Community’s legislation covers the field of energy, environment and competition. The 
agreement is among the EU member states, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, 
Montenegro, Kosova and Albania. A Pan-European energy market is desired by the 
establishment of the Energy Community and the participation of Ukraine and Turkey are highly 
demanded (Aalto, 2008).  
 
Turkey probably stands as the most important transit country in the EU’s energy diversification 
strategy. Due to its geographical location, alternative energy resources from the Caspian Sea and 
the Middle East could reach the EU via Turkey. Hence, Turkey-the EU relations will remain 
important also in the future because Turkey is an energy corridor (European Commission, 2010). 
The European support on Turkey is not only restricted by the Nabucco pipeline project and it is 
highly desired that there may be more pipeline projects that include the Turkish territory as the 
safe area. However, there needs to be radical changes in the Turkish energy market and the EU 
should promote the market mechanisms that require liberalization and privatization. The reform 
process has to be tracked carefully before implemented and the process should not be rushed 
because this is a long-term project (European Commission, 2011). 
 
Ukraine is another major transit country for the energy security of the European Union. Within 
this framework, the EU and Ukraine signed the memorandum of understanding to promote 
partnership in the energy industry. If this memorandum of understanding could be continued in 
the future, Ukraine may be fully integrated in the European energy market (European 
Commission, 2011). The contribution usually comes in financial means. The EU puts the stress 
on the former Soviet Republics and expresses the importance of gaining their trust for the future 
security of energy resources. There are special assistance programmes such as the Technical 
Assisstance for the Commonwealth of Independent States. The main objective of the programme 
is to help the former Soviet Republics to adopt and build well-functioning market economies 
based on private ownership and to promote pluralistic democratic socities. The programme 
provides financial assistance, know-how and practical experience. The states are encouraged to 
bring about economic reforms. The programme was established after a meeting of the European 
Council in December 1990. The legal basis for the programme was adopted on 15 July, 1991. 
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These states are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
 
Funds for the Mediterranean countries are allocated from the budget of the Mediterranean 
Economic Development Area or via binary aids. The programme encourages the economic 
transition of the Mediterranean non-member states, the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean 
free trade area and the mitigation of the social and environmental consequences of economic 
development. The European Investment Bank provided capital and credits for the programme. 
These are the main operations of the programme as listed on Eur-Lex (1996): 
 
 “support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and job creation; 
 the opening-up of markets; 
 promotion of private investment, industrial cooperation and trade between the various 
partners; 
 upgrading of economic infrastructure, including the financial and taxation systems; 
 consolidation of the major financial balances and creation of an economic 
environment favourable to accelerated growth (support for structural adjustment).” 
 
In brief, such programmes may not be directly related to energy; however, these programmes 
constitute the basis of a long-lasting energy relation. There are several similar programmes in 
Africa directly supported and funded by the European Union. The African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States (ACP) are a group of countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
that was created in 1975. The aim of the programme is to eliminate or reduce poverty and 
promote economic growth. The EU’s intention is clear; it is to develop the energy infrastructure 
in the member states of the ACP (European Commission, 2011). 
 
The scale of the energy security problems is obvious but the EU took the initiative recently by 
developing a mutual foreign energy political strategy. The foreign energy strategy is discussed at 
the level of the bureaucrats and all the parties in the European Union have the liberum veto. The 
member states that support all the mutual strategies and the policies of the EU are usually the 
less efficient small member states. These small member states found their lost identity after 
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joining the European Union and for any purpose, as long as it fits to their national interests, they 
do support the suggested mutual operations. Some member states in the Eastern Europe make an 
effort to match up the Western European states and Russia to renegotiate the energy problems. 
Also, several member states like Bulgaria raise difficulties for the construction and investment of 
pipeline within their boundaries and have worry for the energy security of supply due to 
Gazprom’s aggressive strategy in Europe and the Western European interests.      
 
The major countries in the EU have already guaranteed their energy security through their 
national foreign politics, security policies and business incentives they offer to energy suppliers. 
China and the United States have prioritized their energy security strategies on the agenda and 
ensured the security by the external security policies. The United Kingdom commenced its 
international energy strategy in 2004 which aims at securing energy supplies. Some other 
member states have also introduced similar strategies. According to the EU member states, 
national interests of the states safeguard their energy security strategies by eliminating the 
uncertainties in the energy markets and the geopolitical variables. Whenever a strategic raw 
material concerns the national interest of a member state, that state may simply abandon the 
general interest of the EU and it is obvious that if every member state follows their national 
interests, this strategy could definitely harm the European Union-wide co-operation irredeemably 
(Boersma, 2015). The EU stresses that the national interests of the member states must not run 
counter to the common interest of all the member states. The Green Paper states that every 
member state has the right to design its own energy mix. Despite this, any particular decision of 
a member state affects its neighbours and yields substantive results on the energy security of the 
European Union. Hence, before attempting to actualize such decisions, member states should 
choose such options that eliminate or minimize the import dependency risks (Esakova, 2012). 
However, doesn’t matter how consistent and persistent the EU is, a member state will not likely 
bear in mind other member states’ energy security interests.  
 
The international energy markets raise the importance of trendy bilateral relations and member 
states do not flinch from smearing other member states’ interests. For example, the Nord Stream 
pipeline project is signed between the Russian Federation and Germany. The pipeline passes 
through the Baltic Sea and reaches Germany directly from Russia. The pipeline skips Poland and 
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the Baltic states. This pipeline contradicts with the EU’s priority to diversify its energy suppliers. 
However, what is more important here is, this pipeline reveals the absence of solidarity in energy 
security issues between the Eastern European states and Germany.  
Even though, some other member states like Greece and Hungary have also bilateral energy 
relations with various energy suppliers like Egypt, Algeria and Iran, Germany is criticized by the 
EU due its existing energy relation with Russia (Simon, 2015). If the situation is not convenient 
for other member states, their impetus to develop their own national energy policies may become 
a common practice.  
 
There is another matter that restricts the applicability of the energy security of supply approach 
of the EU; that is the fact that the determinant players are the energy corporations on the EU 
side.  Corporations take their own decisions on the construction of new pipelines, refineries and 
energy facilities based on their interests and budgets. For example, when the Italian ENI and the 
Russian Gazprom settled on building a new pipeline with a different route, the Italian energy 
corporation has actually impaired the energy resource diversification approach of the EU.  
 
The EU’s energy security approach is criticized due to the absence of strategic dimension at the 
core of the approach. The criticism mainly focuses on: trade of the global proven energy supply 
reserves are restricted by the states. States all over the globe control ¾ of the natural gas and oil 
production. Therefore, the EU’s competitive approach is severely restricted. Global competition 
for the energy resources requires geopolitical expansion. The strategic shortfall of the EU’s 
energy policies elicits energy supply vulnerability. Other major energy players like China and the 
United States are aware of the above fact but Europe still couldn’t internalize a strategic 
approach. Existing market power and energy dialogues are the main tools of the EU. Also, 
competition for the energy resources escalates due to the state of growing political instability in 
the energy supplying countries. If the EU desires to participate in the international energy 
competition as a significant player, it has to adopt a well-prepared international energy relations 
approach and actualize the approach. The EU should first identify its energy security risks, 
express its security measures and interests, and classify these by its strategic approach. 
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The European Commission finds the market economy mechanism as the best option to compete 
against the rising economic powers and energy importers such as India and China. In order to 
keep up with the rising economies in Asia, the best method is to invite China and India to adopt 
competition based energy market mechanisms and regulations attached to that.  
The European Commission is in favor of market mechanism but in the meantime, the EC spends 
more time on the geopolitical aspect of the energy security which occupies all its attention. 
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union claims that a single solution going 
through market liberalization is not sufficient for the resolution of the energy security dilemma; 
even though, increasing share of the renewable energy in the market relieves a little, the demand 
for natural gas and oil is not decreasing according to the estimations of IEA. Particularly, this has 
to with the escalating competition for the energy resources and the international energy markets 
remained unprepared (IEA, 2014). The energy technocrats of the European Union expressed 
their support for the market mechanism instead of excessively approaching the issue as an 
alliance because they believe that it can actually ruin the harmony in the EU’s energy strategy. 
Furthermore, according to the European Commission, exporting European norms to the energy 
supplying countries pave the ways for the European investments and also this strategy could 
show consistency with the EU’s environmental, economic and democracy-related objectives. 
Ultimately, it is not possible that if the EU does not adopt a coherent and efficient external 
security policy, energy security will always cause a problem in the future. 
 
The EU added an environmental and sustainable growth related perspective to its definition of 
energy security. The short-term energy problems are addressed by the promotion of the market 
mechanism and the long-term problems are addressed by the energy efficiency measures and 
renewable energy penetration in the energy markets. For example, as discussed in the previous 
chapters, the EU’s target is to reach 20% share of the renewable energy consumption until 2020. 
Especially, wind, solar, biomass and hydropower are very important for the future of the EU. All 
the member states have to support and promote renewable energy in order to reach 2020, 2030 
and 2050 targets.  According to the EU, renewable energy is economically feasible and despite 
of the fact that renewable energy is competitive, the energy markets resist against the renewable 
energy penetration. Also, the GHG emissions originating from the EU will be decreased in order 
to reduce the negative impacts of the climate change. Kyoto Protocol is still the primary resource 
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in this context. The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is established following the Kyoto 
Protocol and it is sufficient to understand that the EU is determined to be one step ahead of other 
parties that are also combating the climate change.  
The EU expects their efforts to yield its fruit in the form of a decarbonized economy; and enjoy 
the state of a less dependent Europe on fossil fuels.  
 
Heavy pricing of carbon emissions relatively reduces the use of oil and promotes the use of 
renewable energy resources. In this sense, there has been an increase in the research and 
development activites to explore cleaner energy resources. The EU has spared billions of Euros 
for the R&D activities (European Commission, 2011). At the level of the European Union, 
renewable energy penetration and energy efficiency measures received a lot of support from the 
member states. As emphasized in the previous chapters, foreign or external dimension of the 
issue along with its environmental aspect have to receive more attention. Nowadays, people are 
more conscious about the environmental impacts of the fossil fuels so it is easier to receive 
support from the public and provide up-to-date policies in accordance with the public opinion. 
The EU could pioneer in the development and production of renewable energy technologies in 
the near future if these efforts are maintained. By exporting such technologies, the EU can 
increase its energy security; grow its economy and create employment opportunities. According 
to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), excluding hydropower, renewable 
energy jobs reached an estimated 7.7 million in 2014. The renewable energy industry in the EU 
is estimated to employ 2.8 million people in 2020 and 3.4 million people in 2030 if all the targets 
are achieved. The market size is predicted to reach €200 billion by 2020.   
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
The significant obstruction that prevents further consolidation and dissemination of EU-wide 
energy policies and strategies has to do with the national interests of each and every member 
state. Majority of the member states seemed unwilling to delegate the EU to decide on and 
implement one-size-fits-all energy policies and strategies. The problem is linked to 
constitutionalism. Obviously, energy policies affect the national security of a state and therefore, 
it is a matter of national interest. Particularly, the conflict of interest heats up whenever the 
external dimension of energy security is the concern on the agenda. The invitation to possess a 
monaural EU-wide energy strategy is only taken into serious consideration by the former Soviet 
Eastern Bloc countries because these countries reached a dead-end in terms of energy 
procurement. However, member states individually cannot struggle against difficulties in the 
world energy markets and the EU is lack of political support in order to show an effective 
approach to the subject.  
 
Accelerating competition in the international energy markets politicizes the energy relations and 
diplomacy. Major players like the United States and China bolster the competition up. China 
follows its state-enriching policies and the United States sustains its intensive foreign energy 
diplomacy. On the other hand, Russia pursues such energy policies that constitute the core of its 
foreign politics. The European Union expands its influence to Asia, North Africa, Caspian Sea 
and South America in order to remain competitive in the energy markets. Until now, competition 
is sustained individually; meaning that Germany, France and the UK signed their bilateral 
agreements with the suppliers and chaired the entire European energy politics. It is obvious that 
these three member states predestinated the future of the European energy politics until now. On 
the other hand, every rich member states like Norway (fossil fuels) and Spain (renewable energy) 
have maintained sufficient resources, apart from their contribution to the energy interests of the 
European Union. For example, France is reluctant to construct energy infrastructure that links the 
Spanish grids to the rest of Europe. The reason for this is that France has already been 
consuming cheap energy from its nuclear power plants and giving the way to excess Spanish 
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energy produced from renewable energy resources may cause devastating results for the French 
energy market. In this example we see that national interests of France emerge and surpass the 
overall interests of the European Union. Hence, the reckless attitude may spread among the 
member states and may result in conflict of interest.     
 
Whenever energy is subject to discussion, the European Union member states do not hesitate to 
adopt policies and strategies that may be debilitating for other member states as we see in the 
case of Russia. Until the approval of EU-wide energy policies, the Baltic States were actually 
isolated and left to their fate. Probably, the right thing to do is that energy has to be 
comprehended only as a commercial matter rather than a political tool to leverage and practice 
power on other countries. The European Union endeavors to promote the market economy 
principles to energy exporters to achieve the previous statement. In this context, through bilateral 
agreements and regional dialogues, the EU strengthens its relations with the energy exporters. 
For example, this approach toward Russia has been failing continuously because the Caspian Sea 
region countries still value their diplomatic ties with Russia and does not favor market economy 
principles with the exception of Azerbaijan. Naturally, the Gulf States maintain their national 
interests rather than minding the European values because they have a strong bargaining power 
in the energy markets. For example, the case of Algeria illustrates the reluctance of MEDA 
member states that deny or dismiss the influential presence of the European Union on their 
politics. On the other hand, political instability in some of the North African countries halts the 
constitution of necessary energy relations with the EU. Concisely, the optimistic approach of the 
EU that has to purpose to ensure energy security in Europe via sustainable relations with the 
energy exporters did not work as expected.  
 
The energy import diversification strategy has been one of the most significant strategies of the 
European Union. The EU ensures its energy security through this strategy but it did not find an 
EU-wide political foundation; therefore, the attempts were unsuccessful. At the heart of this 
strategy, the EU intends to reduce its energy imports from Russia. Nevertheless, some of the 
member states find it illogical and signed bilateral energy agreements with Russia. 
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 Furthermore, the EU takes its Asian competitors like India and China into account for its 
influential expansion through Asian energy markets. For example, Azerbaijan plays a crucial role 
in the procurement of energy resources from east to west. On the other hand, Turkey is a 
geographical corridor to Europe; ensuring the security of energy resources and transportation as 
a reliable partner. Turkey’s geographical location is close to the regions that have the largest 
proven natural gas reserves in the world; and since the European Union’s energy strategies 
disregard Russia as a reliable energy exporter, Turkey is the only terrestrial path that connects 
Europe and Asia. However, it is important to mention that the EU only invests in pipeline 
projects, infrastructure and facilities if it’s in their favor. Apart from that, Norway contributes to 
energy security of the EU as a reliable and stable European state. The country is capable of 
providing natural gas and crude oil; and prioritizes the domestic European energy markets for its 
products (European Commission, 2011). 
 
Since the pipelines and other energy infrastructure in Ukraine and Belarus are at stake, the 
Nabucco pipeline project, if built, may substitute them and fill the gap. There is another pipeline 
project being constructed right now; that is the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), 
known as the silk road of energy. TANAP is going to bring natural gas produced from 
Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz-2 gas field, and other areas of the Caspian Sea, primarily to Turkey, but 
also on to Europe. The European Union will enjoy the outcomes of the pipeline when it is fully 
constructed in 2018.  
 
The EU has adopted the 2020, 2030 and 2050 targets that rely on the foundation of energy 
security. If achieved, these targets are going to create a whole new energy market in the EU. 
Mainly, the fossil fuels imports will be reduced and new industries following the renewable 
energy expansion will accelerate the European economic growth. However, the expectations are 
in the way that the EU will not be as successful as anticipated. As this research demonstrates that 
the EU has to put a lot more efforts to achieve the desired outcomes of the energy policies and 
strategies. It may be in the form of co-operation and partnership. Co-ordination can be 
maintained on the basis of economic, political, social and environmental levels. Synthetic 
relations that simply rely on national interests may not be sustainable or beneficial for any 
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parties. Energy should not be used as a tool to influence others and be discussed in economic and 
commercial terms only. The international organizations such as the IEA, OPEC and NATO 
should put up the interests of their member states and neutrally mediate between   
 
Several NATO member states created the Energy Security Center of Excellence (ENSEC COE) 
in an attempt to equip NATO with expertise; and member states support the organization on 
energy security issues. NATO can increase the awareness of other states on natural resource 
competition, climate change and energy efficiency measures. NATO can certainly facilitate the 
procurement of energy resources and mediate between the energy exporters and its member 
states. The IEA’s role can never be belittling in the international energy market setting. 
However, the organization has to redouble its efforts to reach its objectives; economic growth; 
energy security; environmental awareness and international co-operation (IEA, n.d.). On the 
other hand, OPEC has assertive objectives like the eradication of energy poverty and the 
conservation of energy demand and supply balance but mostly the objectives mostly concentrate 
on the commercial part of the issue. It may be worth being remembered more than an 
organization which serves the interests of its members. It is also important but these three 
organizations should co-operate and share information more often.  
 
The European authorities should form a basis for these organizations to meet and discuss the 
future of energy security; third countries should be allowed to participate and make themselves 
heard during these forums or events. Environmental dimension of the subject has to be 
elaborated and further discussed. Timing is at the core of the issue. Non-governmental 
organizations may be employed to raise the popularity of the subject and communicate with 
other NGOs in other countries. In any of the events, the importance of dialogues is stressed. If all 
the parties could communicate their interests on the basis of mutual understanding, partnership 
and respect, we may lay the foundation of an energy secure future. These organizations employ 
highly-skilled energy experts to steer their organizations and give advice to the authorities in the 
member states. Doesn’t matter how bad the circumstance is, military intervention should never 
be an option on the table. Perhaps, people who research the national security dimension of 
energy security would say that military intervention does more harm than good. 
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It might be logical to place importance to small EU member states that feel alienated in energy 
diplomacy traffic. In fact, these countries are geographically close to energy transit and energy 
exporting countries. Perfect and timely information dissemination may prevent further conflicts 
with the energy exporters or help the EU build stronger relations with them. It has been 
emphasized for so long that an EU-wide energy co-operation is the most necessary thing. 
However, this idea should not remain unfulfilled and should be immediately actualized by the 
member states. The co-operation requires trust, expertise, know-how and determination; and the 
EU possesses all of the competence and characteristics above.  
 
There may be further research on environmental, political, economic and social dimensions of 
energy security executed in an attempt to enlighten the authorities and decision-makers at the 
state and corporation level. Corporations may pursue an amicable strategy toward energy related 
projects in other countries; and rather than making the maximum profit out of it, these 
corporations may invest some of their profit in different industries or projects in these countries 
for sprouting up stronger relations that are not purely economical. The project-hosting country 
may share the same thoughts and exercise what has been done in somewhere else. It is important 
to clarify that this is what Foreign Direct Investment or known as FDI is. It is crucial for the 
development and growth of economies. FDIs’ bring monetary circulation and ensure constant 
dialogues between the partner countries. It is obvious that both the energy importers and 
exporters share similar interests and if this could be sustained jointly on the basis of a strong 
relationship, all the parties can enjoy the favorable atmosphere and concentrate more on other 
things that busy their agenda. It is recommended that further research on energy security should 
be carried out with the purpose of revealing more information on the other dimensions of the 
issue.   
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